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"If we are serious about the free exercise of religion, we should protect
free exercise whenever we can, by protecting sincere religion in most
cases even if we realize that human error will prevent us from protecting
it in all cases." 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution protects
against abridgment of the "free exercise" of religion.2 Like other guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights,3 the clause initially limited only the national
1. Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTnAN CENTURY,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 882, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stipulating "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof") (emphasis added).
3. The Bill of Rights consists of the first ten amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. These amendments encompass a multiplicity of guarantees that include freedom of
religion, speech, press, association, and assembly (First Amendment); right of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth Amendment); freedom from self-incrimi-
nation and double jeopardy and due process (Fifth Amendment); rights of accused persons
in criminal prosecutions (Sixth Amendment); and right against cruel and unusual punish-
ments (Eighth Amendment), among other guarantees. Although integrated into the Con-
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government, but became applicable to the states in 1940 in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,4 wherein the Supreme Court incorporated free exercise pro-
tection against the States.' Lawsuits brought under this clause "almost
always concern individuals or small groups whose beliefs differ from
those of their neighbors."6 The Free Exercise Clause is one of two pro-
tections relating to religion under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The other is the Establishment Clause,7 which, like
Free Exercise, initially limited only the national government, but was ap-
plied to the states in 1947. The tool of that incorporation was Everson v.
Board of Education.8 The "touchstone" of the Establishment Clause is
"the principle that the First Amendment mandates governmental neutral-
ity between religion and religion, and between religion and non[-]
religion.'
stitution, the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, four years after the ratification of the main
document in 1787.
4. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness punished
for inciting a breach of the peace by proselytizing on the streets of New Haven,
Connecticut).
5. See id. at 303 (stating that "the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants,
deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The fundamental liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment."). Six years earlier, in Hamilton v. Regents
of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), involving a religious objection challenge by
two Methodist students, the Court implicitly agreed that the principle of free exercise must
afford protection to outward manifestations of religious beliefs. See id. at 262. Note, as
already hinted in the excerpt above from the Cantwell case, that the tool used to incorpo-
rate this and other guarantees against the states is the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (forbidding the States from "depriv[ing] any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). The clause basically forbids un-
reasonable or arbitrary government action and requires the government to follow the ap-
propriate procedures in formulating and implementing its policies. See KENNETH JANDA
ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 484 (8th ed. 2005).
6. GARRETr Epps, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 113 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stipulating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion").
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a New Jersey statute which authorized local school
districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from
schools). In Everson, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[t]he First Amendment has
erected a wall between church and state" that "must be kept high and impregnable" with
no allowance for "the slightest breach." Id. at 18. Yet, as suggested already, the Court
found that New Jersey had not breached that wall. Id. Justice Souter recently praised
Everson as the decision "which inaugurated the modern era of establishment doctrine."
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 687-88 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
9. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1947) (internal quotations omitted). For a most recent interpretation of the clause,
see McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (stating when the government favors a particular religion, it "sends the ... mes-
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The Religion Clauses are like two sides of a coin that necessarily com-
plement each other. The first, the Establishment Clause, forbids the gov-
ernment from sponsoring an official religion. The second, the Free
Exercise Clause guarantees against federal and state infringement of re-
ligious practices.' The two clauses "reflect the Framers' vision of an
American Nation free of the religious strife that ...long plagued the
nations of Europe."'" However, although they "express complementary
sage to . . .nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members") (internal quotations omitted).
10. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 113 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). In bifurcating, as it does, its provisions relating to
religion, the United States sets itself apart from many other countries and international
organizations like the United Nations, which unify those provisions. See, e.g., Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [here-
inafter UDHR] ("[E]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom.., to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 21, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu.humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm
[hereinafter ICCPR] (using virtually similar language and provisions as the UDHR).
11. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Breyer explains that, collectively, the clauses "embody an understanding, reached in
the [seventeenth] century after decades of religious war, that liberty and social stability
demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of all citizens, permits those
citizens to worship God in their own way, and allows all families to teach their children and
to form their characters as they wish." Id. (citing C. RADCLIFFE, THE LAW AND ITS COM-
PASS 71 (1960)) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and
government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of democ-
racy."). Consistent with these viewpoints, "freedom of every person to worship God in his
own way-everywhere in the world," was one of Four Freedoms President Franklin D.
Roosevelt announced would form the basis for peace and security in the post-World War II
international order. See ERIC FONER, VOICES OF FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
158-60 (2005). After the War, the Roosevelt administration helped found the United Na-
tions system under whose tutelage, an international bill of human rights has evolved pro-
viding for protection of not only freedom of worship in a general sense but also of minority
religions. See UDHR, G.A. Res. 217A, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (relating to
freedom to worship generally); ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 21, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (regarding protection of minority religions, providing
"[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging
to such minorities shall not be denied the right ... to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language"). The nature of the tie of the
Religious Clauses to social stability exists in the manner of a concern that governmental
sponsorship of official religion or unconstitutional abridgement of religious practices poses
a "threat" of religious "divisiveness," specifically "political divisions along religious lines,"
that could harm "the normal political process." See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 719 (2002).
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values," 2 the two clauses are also, simultaneously, "frequently in ten-
sion,"' 3 a factor, not surprisingly, accounting for their high litigiousness.' 4
The First Amendment, by its literal language, enjoins a strict separation
between religion and the government,15 that the Supreme Court rarely, if
12. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718-19 (2005) (holding that section three of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, RLUIPA, discussed infra
Part 111.D., does not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution).
13. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004) (upholding against challenge as "pre-
sumptively unconstitutional" a Washington State program which funds training for all
fields of study, except theology); see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664,
668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."). Likewise, several scholars have
commented on the same tension; see Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden
History of Employment Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 1020 (1998) (stating,
somewhat dramatically, that the United States Constitution "tries both to build a shrine of
free exercise for unknown gods and to confine them in it by prohibiting establishment");
see also Mary H. Mitchell, Professor Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law, Seminar in the Law of Church
and State (Summer 2006) (stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits exemption for
religious reasons, whereas the Free Exercise Clause requires such exemption, with a "zone
of permissible accommodation" in between that the government must tread creatively).
14. See STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE iii (2001) (stating that the Relig-
ion Clauses "are among the most frequently litigated in the United States Supreme Court,
and generate more than their share of high-profile constitutional disputes in the lower
courts").
15. Id. As Professor Gey explains, the Establishment Clause forbids government fa-
voritism of religion as well as "government actions respecting an establishment of relig-
ion." Id. A literal reading of this clause would forbid a State's efforts, even indirectly, to
endorse or aid religious practices or beliefs. See id. Similarly, the text of the Free Exercise
Clause contains separatist overtones. The clause suggests that government action which
restricts religious exercise should be upheld by the courts, so long as the restrictions do not
"prohibit the free exercise thereof." Id. But modern courts do not take this approach,
otherwise the United States would erect a "wall of separation" between church and state as
Thomas Jefferson advocated in his letter to the Danbury Baptists Association in 1802. Id.
(citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)
(reprinted in STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 29 (2001)). For Supreme Court
Justice Black, well-known for his insistence on a literal interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, "no law" relating to religion meant literally NO law. Id. Under this severely literal
interpretation, which never found majority support on the Supreme Court, "courts would
be obligated to strike down any law having the slightest tendency to favor religion, and
would likewise be obligated to uphold any law restricting religious practice, unless that law
had the effect of outlawing the practice altogether." Id. Another way to look at the Relig-
ion Clauses, as Professor Mitchell teaches, is that the Establishment Clause prohibits ex-
emption for religious reasons, whereas the Free Exercise Clause requires such exemption,
with a "zone of permissible accommodation" in between that the government must tread
creatively. Mary H. Mitchell, Professor Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law, Seminar in the Law of
Church and State (Summer 2006).
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ever, applied.16 The brevity of the First Amendment (a mere sixteen
words framing two clauses), plus the difficulty of literally interpreting the
clauses, has led to a situation whereby the Court goes beyond the text of
the First Amendment, in seeking "to define the proper limits of the rela-
tionship between church and state."17 However, this occurrence can
work a Catch-22 for the Court: it thrusts "interpretive issues ... at the
forefront of Religion Clause litigation,"1 8 which, in turn, creates "incon-
sistencies in the Court's own treatment of church/state issues."' 9
No case typifies these inconsistencies more than Employment Division
v. Smith, °2 "the mother document of a radically new interpretation of
the" Free Exercise Clause,2 ' and the decision that forms the cynosure of
the book under review. In Smith //,22 a five-member majority of the
Court both "rewrote the entire jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause,
leaving it a much narrower guarantee than had previously been
thought[,]" 23 and interpreted the same clause as a matter of "majoritarian
rule rather than a protection of individual conscience., 24 The case illus-
trates like no other, what Garrett Epps calls "the quality of tragedy," that
sometimes takes place when "[t]wo opposed rights come into conflict,
16. Id. Instead, in interpreting the clauses, as Professor Gey conveyed, "the Court has
vacillated between a moderately separationist interpretation . . . and a more lenient ap-
proach that permits-and sometimes requires-government action accommodating relig-
ious belief and practice." Id.
17. Id. This is the boundary Professor Mitchell denominates a "zone of permissible
accommodation," sandwiched between the Establishment Clause's prohibition of religious
exemption and the Free Exercise Clause's requirement of such an exemption. Mary H.
Mitchell, Professor Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law, Seminar in the Law of Church and State (Sum-
mer 2006).
18. Id.
19. STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE iv (2001); accord JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR. & EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 515-16 (2001)
("No area of modem law ... has been so marked by sectarian struggle, so strained by
fundamental fissures, so reflective of deep American doubts and aspirations" than the Re-
ligion Clauses).
20. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). I presume that it is this very same case that Professor Gey
was adverting to when he wrote that "[i]n the Free Exercise area, a [c]ourt that is viewed as
increasingly friendly to religious practitioners is nevertheless also responsible for virtually
eviscerating Free Exercise Clause protections against generally applicable governmental
restrictions that impinge on religious practices." STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE
STATE iv (2001).
21. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 2 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
22. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division
v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 1015 (1998).
24. Nat Hentoff, Justice Scalia vs. The Free Exercise of Religion, WASH. POST, May 19,
1990, at A25.
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and one destroys the other," with the result, in the end, that "both suffer
loss. "25
The book under review joins a growing list of scholarship on the case,26
yet departs from existing studies in that, rather than focusing on the deci-
sion itself, the book unveils the "hidden history, '27 like the "faces and
scenes . . . that courts and judges were too busy and too important to
understand, 2 8 underlying the avalanche of news headlines and legal
commentaries relating to the case. The journey began in 1994 when, once
he concluded that the Smith decisions made "a good case for historical
research, ' 29 Epps (then an associate professor of law at the University of
Oregon School of Law) set out to find and document the actual people
and decisions that precipitated the decision.3" His methodology of choice
was the historical method, specifically "oral interviews designed to sup-
plement and illuminate the written record."31 To justify his use of this
methodology, Epps stated that oral history can "elicit the kind of infor-
mation often omitted by those who prepare written documents," while at
the same time addressing the problem of "distortions" relating to the
study of constitutional litigation in America that historian Morton J. Hor-
witz criticized.32 Versions of Epps's extensive study of religious freedom
25. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division
v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 1021 (1998) (quoting 1 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the
History of Philosophy 446 (E.S. Haldane trans. Univ. of Neb. Press 1995)).
26. See, e.g., DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND:
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INDIAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF Oregon v. Smith
(2000); Carolyn Nestor Long, Religious Freedom and Indian Rights: The Case of Oregon v.
Smith 196-99 (2000); Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: Religious Freedom on Trial 277
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (disclosing that Galen Black, co-plaintiff in the
Smith case, is "at work on his own memoir" related to the dispute, that if and when it
comes out, will add to the building literature on the decision).
27. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Di-
vision v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 1015 (1998) for the use of the phrase "hidden his-
tory." The piece is an integral part of the published result of Epps's general study on
religious freedom.
28. GARRET Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 259 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
29. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division
v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 953 (1998).
30. Id. at 957.
31. Id.; see also PAUL THOMPSON, THE VOICE OF THE PAST: ORAL HISTORY (2d 1988)
(inspiring Professor Epps's methodology, as the authority on oral history).
32. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 957-58 (1998). Horwitz wrote, "Not only do tradi-
tional constitutional histories include a large number of atypical 'great cases' but
constitutional cases are also unrepresentative either as intellectual history or as examples
of social control . . . But another, more crucial, distortion has been introduced by the
excessive equation of constitutional law with 'law."' Id. (quoting MORTON J. HORWITZ,
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appeared as articles and presentations both before and since publication
of this book. Versions published before the appearance of the book in-
clude two law review articles, one on the case referenced repeatedly in
this book review,33 and another, focusing on the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act (analyzed in Part III below),34 as well as a presentation
to "a work-in-progress seminar at the Western Law Teachers of Color
Annual Meeting in March 1998."" 5 The only available work related to
Epps's study of religious freedom that has been published since the
book's appearance is a chapter in a text released in 2004.36
The major players in the Smith lawsuit, or "protagonists," as Epps mel-
odramatically denominates them, are Al(fred) L. Smith, Jr., a native
American; Galen Black, a Caucasian; the Douglas County Council on Al-
cohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT), the non-
governmental organization Smith and Black worked for as counselors;
and David B. Frohnmayer, then Attorney General of Oregon. Studies
have been written about unlikely litigants who make constitutional law.37
The Smith case is one of those instances. The parties in Smith had no
inkling they were participating in something that, in the end, would put
their otherwise bland names in the annals of constitutional history.38
Both Black and Smith had troubled upbringings and broken marriages.
Both were also recovering alcoholics trying to turn a new chapter in their
lives after years of alcohol abuse. In addition, Smith was marrying again
and, at the ripe age of sixty, starting a new family that he needed to sup-
port. When the second Smith case was decided in 1990, Al Smith was
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1790, at xii (1997)). Here too Epps tells
us oral history proved beneficial. It "revealed a wealth of information that the official
record does not disclose[,]" including the fact, for example, that the case originated "as a
dispute less about religion than about the proper treatment philosophy for recovering al-
coholics-particularly Native American alcoholics[,]" and "that each of the major players in
the case saw it quite differently from the others." Id. at 958. This point is elaborated upon
Infra Part IV.C., highlighting the significance of the book. Infra Part IV.C.
33. Id. at 953-1021.
34. Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 563 (1998).
35. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 953 (1998).
36. GARRETT EppS, THE STORY OF AL SMITH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT MEETS
GRANDFATHER PEYOTE, IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES (2004).
37. JOHN A. GARRATY, QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
38. See id. (Michael Dorf, Constitutional Law Stories (2004) (citing Garrett Epps,
THE STORY OF AL SMITH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT MEETS GRANDFATHER PEYOTE). The
reference to bland name has particular meaning for Al Smith, who worried that because he
did not have an Indian name, he would arrive in the spirit world after his death and the
spirit people would not recognize his arrival. GARRETT" EppS, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RE-
LIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 10 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
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nearly seventy years old. In short, none of the co-plaintiffs, more so
Smith, was prepared for the economic and psychological aggravations of
a lawsuit at that point. A socioeconomic world separated Frohnmayer
from Smith and Black; unlike the duo, Frohnmayer "early in life estab-
lished a pattern of success that has hardly been broken since."3 9 Yet,
arguably even Frohnmayer's involvement in the lawsuit was unlikely.
Every lawsuit has it's complementing sides. The two sides to this lawsuit
were Smith and Black, both of them co-plaintiffs. The "natural" defen-
dant in the lawsuit was ADAPT, the nongovernmental agency that op-
posed the unemployment compensation for the two plaintiffs.
Frohnmayer's participation in the case was fortuitous. The Attorney
General's Office, which Frohnmayer headed, became involved because it
advised the Employment Division, to which the plaintiffs made their
claim for benefits.40 It was an advisory role Frohnmayer took seriously."1
This book review provides an extended review of Epps's book. It has
four parts, in addition to this introduction and a conclusion. Part II
presents the facts and holding of Smith, along with a post-mortem. Part
III articulates and discusses four aftermaths of Smith, including the pas-
sage of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
of 2000 not covered in the Epps's study. Part IV highlights the impor-
tance of Professor's Epps's scholarship on the Smith cases, including
three lessons that bear on the significance of that research. Part V com-
ments on the recognition to Epps resulting from the book.
39. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division
v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 966 (1998).
40. GARRETr Epps, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 143 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (stating that, in discharging its responsibilities in this
lawsuit, the Attorney General's Office acted more out of its concern for the "state's unem-
ployment system, its constitution, and its drug laws," than for the possible effect that grant-
ing unemployment benefits to Smith and Black would have on ADAPT or its philosophy
of treatment).
41. Id.
From the day he was elected, Dave Frohnmayer had insisted that state agencies regard
his office as the law firm for the state. The state should speak with one legal voice, he
said. That was because the issue in any given case was not simply what would be best
for the state agency involved but what would be best for the state of Oregon as a
whole. Legal positions taken by one agency could compromise the state's general
interests down the road, and so they needed to be reviewed by the A[ttorney]
G[eneral], who was trying to think ahead of all the pending and possible issues that
could be affected by a given case. The AG's role ... is a bit like that of a chess master,
who must not be distracted by the current threat or opportunity and thus neglect the
possibility of a strategic disaster many moves away.
Id. at 119-20.
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II. THE SMITH CASE
A. Facts, Holding, and Opposition Within the Court to Smith
Smith and Black worked for ADAPT, a private drug rehabilitation
agency located in Roseburg, Oregon, and were fired for ingesting peyote
as part of a Native American church service or religious ceremony.4 2 At
the time of this lawsuit, peyote was classified as an illegal drug in most
42. Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 876, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886.
Peyote or mescal, known botanically as Lophophora Williamsii Lemaire, is a small spine-
less cactus that grows in southwest Texas and northern Mexico. Id; GARRET- Epps, To AN
UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 59-60 (The Notably Trials Library 2005)
(2001). The plant creates tubers or buds, called buttons, which have hallucinogenic compo-
nents. Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 876, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886.
The qualities of Peyote buttons, extremely bitter, difficult to chew and to swallow, limit the
popularity of peyote as a recreational drug. See id. at 878, 882. Native Americans have
used peyote for religious or church services going back to the mid-sixteenth century when
the practice was first described in Spanish records. Id. at 877. One legend that developed
around this plant is that a Native woman, without food and water wandering across the
desert, was nearly dead when she had a vision that a nearby wild cactus would save her life.
GARRET-r Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 60 (The Notably
Trials Library 2005) (2001). She'ate the plant and gained the strength to locate and return
to her village. Id. Ever since, Native Americans have used the cactus to cure diseases,
acquire strength, see visions, or as talisman carried on or placed close to the body for good
luck or protection, or simply -as a god-object to which prayers can be directed. Douglas
Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 4, 1989, at
878, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886. In a typical pe-
yote church service, participants wear their finest garments to sit around a ceremonial fire
all night in a tipi. Id.; GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON
TRIAL 61 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). A Road man, a type of pastor, offici-
ates the service, with the aid of a Fire man, charged with tending the fire, a Cedar man,
charged with maintaining the incense (cedar aroma), and a Drummer, charged with main-
taining a steady cadence throughout the night on a drum. At several points throughout the
night, the celebrants are offered peyote and celebrants sing songs related to the ceremony.
Id. The rest of the participants sit motionless, gazing into the -fire and meditating on pe-
yote's gifts. Id. Throughout the night, consecrated water is also consumed. Id. At sunrise,
the participants eat breakfast together and disperse in a sober state, as peyote's effects
have typically worn off. Id. The ceremony is described as powerful probably because pe-
yote increases concentration allowing participates to focus on their weaknesses and on the
spiritual tasks they must perform. Id. at 61-62. Additionally, peyote allows the partici-
pants to disregard their suffering from sitting cross-legged for between twelve to fifteen
hours without back support. Id. at 62. Hallucinations, visions, or related "bad trips" are
rare and regarded as a bad sign. Id. Adherents of peyote religion have a united ethical
code. Id. Members are to consume peyote only at a meeting or church service, convened
and controlled by a leader. See id. The use of peyote for nonreligious purpose is consid-
ered sacrilegious. See id.; accord Employment Div., Dep't Human Res. Oregon v. Smith
(Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 919 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Association
on American Indian Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae 5-6)).
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U.S. jurisdictions, but the federal government and twenty-three states
also granted exemptions for religious use.4 3 Oregon, however, main-
tained a flat ban with no exemption for religious purposes. Smith and
Black filed claims for unemployment compensation with the Employ-
ment Division of the Oregon Human Resources Department. Their
claims were denied on the ground that their dismissal was work-related
"misconduct. '" ADAPT, their former employer, instigated that denial.45
The two men appealed their case first to the Oregon Employment Ap-
peals Board,46 and then to the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon
Supreme Court.47 The state supreme court ruled that, while the state
constitution and laws provided no exemption for religious use of peyote,
denying the claimants benefits for using peyote in religious ceremonies
To the members, peyote is consecrated with powers to heal body, mind and spirit. It
•.. teaches the way to spiritual life through living in harmony and balance with the
forces of the Creation. The rituals are an integral part of the life process. They em-
body a form of worship in which the sacrament Peyote is the means for communicat-
ing with the Great Spirit. Id.
. 43. Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 876, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886
(indicating twenty-three states afford such religious exemptions). Federal drug authorities
even issued licenses to produce peyote for religious users. Id.
44. OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(1) (West 2006). Oregon law permitted the denial of
benefits to an individual who is "discharged for misconduct connected with work." Id. (cit-
ing Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 1), 485 U.S. 660, 664 n.6 (1988)). The particular act
of misconduct that, under the State's administrative regulation, can lead to denial of bene-
fits was "a willful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to
expect of an employe [sic]." Id. (quoting OR. ADMIN. R. 475-030-0038 (West 2003)).
45. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 141 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). For ADAPT, firing Black and Smith was not enough.
Rather, in addition, the agency considered it "offensive," as Professor Epps averred, "for
heretics like Black and Smith to profit from apostasy" by receiving unemployment bene-
fits. Id.
46. Id. at 142-43. This is an administrative agency, above the Employment Division
(of the Department of Human Resources), charged with responsibility for review of deni-
als of claims for unemployment compensation. Id. The board reversed judgments for the
claimants by the Employment Division. Id. (including the reasons the board gave for de-
nying benefits).
47. Id. at 142-43. Oregon rules of civil procedure grant the right of direct appeal from
the Employment Appeals Board to the Oregon Court of Appeals, by "aggrieved parties."
Id. at 143. From this point on, the proceedings in the litigation would become public and
additionally ADAPT would no longer be the only party opposing the claimants. Id. The
Oregon Attorney General's Office, led by David Frohnmayer, would also come on board.
Id.
[B]ecause the appeal was a challenge to the decision of a state agency, the attorney
general's office now entered the case, representing the Employment Appeals Board.
The Attorney General's office was not primarily concerned with the effect of the case
on ADAPT or its philosophy of treatment; its concerns were the state's unemploy-
ment system, its constitution, and its drug laws. Id.
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contradicted the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents in Sherbert and its
progeny (discussed infra), and violated their rights under the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the Constitution. 8 Oregon appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court,4 9 which granted review.50 There, in the first Smith case, the Su-
preme Court, per Justice Stevens, vacated Oregon state court judgments
and the Oregon Supreme Court, and remanded the case for a ruling as to
"whether the religious use of peyote was legal in Oregon."'" On remand,
the Oregon Supreme Court ruled, in a per curiam opinion, that
[t]he Oregon statute against possession of controlled substances,
which include peyote, makes no exception for the sacramental use of
peyote, but ... outright prohibition of good[-]faith religious use of
peyote by adult members of the Native American Church would vio-
late the First Amendment. We therefore reaffirm our holding that
the First Amendment entitles petitioners to unemployment
compensation.52
48. Id. at 147. The litigation came to the Oregon Supreme Court as two separate
cases. Id. at 143. Regarding Al Smith, the court ruled, "[t]he legality of ingesting peyote
does not affect our analysis of the state's interest. The state's interest in denying unem-
ployment benefits to a claimant discharged for religiously[-]motivated misconduct must be
found in the unemployment compensation statutes, not in the criminal statutes proscribing
the use of the peyote." Id. at 172-73 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith I), 485
U.S. 660, 666 (1988)). As to Black, it ruled that denial of benefits "did not violate [the
Oregon religious clauses] but did violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution." Id. at 147 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 1), 485 U.S.
660, 661-62 (1988)).
49. Id. Epps wrote that as Frohnmayer, Oregon State's attorney general, "saw it, the
opinions in both cases [Black and Smith] seemed to beg for Supreme Court review." Id.
This is not to mention the attorney general's conviction that "someone must be behind this
challenge," specifically that the two lawsuits were "a test case being brought by civil liber-
tarians or drug reformers." Id. at 148. In its petition for certiorari, the Attorney General's
office framed the question presented in Smith I as, whether "the Free Exercise Clause
compel[s] a state to award unemployment benefits to a drug rehabilitation counselor who
agrees to refrain from using illegal drugs as a condition of his employment and is fired for
misconduct after illegally ingesting peyote as part of a religious ceremony?" Id. at 148-49.
50. Employment Div. v. Smith, 480 U.S. 916 (1987). Upon granting certiorari, the
Supreme Court consolidated the two lawsuits into one case denominated Employment Di-
vision, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith and Black. GARRETr Epps, To
AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 149 (The Notably Trials Library
2005) (2001).
51. Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 1), 485 U.S. 660, 660 (1988). Only four mem-
bers of the Court joined the opinion, three of whom (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun) strongly dissented. Id. at 675-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy did
not participate in the decision. Id. at 660.
52. GARRET Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 187-88
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (quoting Smith v. Employment Div., 763 Pa. 146,
148 (Or. 1988)). To the query by the United States Supreme Court as to whether peyote
religious use was protected under the Oregon constitution, the Oregon Supreme Court
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The dispute should have ended here if the Oregon Attorney General's
Office had not asked for the U.S. Supreme Court's involvement again.53
This time the Attorney General, in his petition for review, argued that the
case now presented the issue of whether "the federal constitution pro-
tects religious use of dangerous drugs."54 Once again, the Supreme Court
obliged by granting certiorari.5
5
In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause did not preclude enforcement of otherwise valid laws of
general application that incidentally burden religious conduct.56 Stated
responded in a terse footnote as to why it could not give an answer: "Because no criminal
case is before us, we do not give an advisory opinion on the circumstances under which the
prosecuting members of the Native American Church under [the state statute] for sacra-
mental use of peyote would violate the Oregon Constitution." Id. at 188 (quoting Smith v.
Employment Div., 763 Pa. 146, 148 n.3 (Or. 1988)). Professor Epps observes that the Ore-
gon Supreme Court's opinion "was a skimpy, oddly truculent document." Id. at 187. Part
of the reason for that conclusion was that the opinion was a per curiam decision no single
justice took credit for writing. Id. "This form of opinion is usually reserved for decisions
that raise few interesting issues or have been made necessary by the obstinacy of the par-
ties rather than the legal requirements of the case." Id. However none of these require-
ments for a per curiam decision presents itself here. Overall, "[t]he opinion had an
impatient tone, as if the court was asking what Smith was doing in front of it again." Id. at
188. The opinion could be read as reminding the United States Supreme Court that they
invented the First Amendment case law. Id. "[I]t is your doctrine, the opinion can be read
to say; if you want to scrap it, then you do it." Id.
53. Id. at 189. Frohnmayer could not just drop the issue. Id. at 188. He believed the
Oregon Supreme Court was wrong on the merits in that, "by favoring peyote religion, it
'established' this one sect as a favored government church[,]" and its decision would open
the floodgates for litigation over religious drug use. Id. at 189. Concerned that "[t]he
wrong result in Washington might harm Indian religion around the country[,]" Oregon
newspapers, including one from the AG's hometown, ran editorials criticizing his decision
to seek review of Smith I. Id. at 189. There were other groups or organizations that ad-
vised Frohnmayer, but to no avail, not to seek review. Id. These included a group of
professors from the Oregon University School of Law. Id. Another organization was the
Native American Rights Fund (NARF), "a powerhouse in the world of federal Indian
law," which "represents tribal governments and Native organizations around the country."
Id. at 185, 194. NARF wrote circular letters requesting its members to call or write
Frohnmayer, advising him to act compassionately by dropping the case. Id. at 194.
54. Id. at 188. The Attorney General, in his petition for review, went as far as to
suggest that "the federal exemption for religious peyote use was constitutionally suspect."
Id. "[T]he [federal] exemption for peyote was merely a product of the [Drug Enforcement
Administration's] perception of congressional will; that in fact the agency lacks authority to
create such exemptions; and that, in any event, congressional members were wrong." See
id. at 189.
55. Id. (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077, 1077 (1989)). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on March 19, 1989, little over three months after Oregon's Attor-
ney General made the request for review on January 16, 1989. Id.
56. Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 11), 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("[T]he right of
free exercise does not relieve [an] individual of the obligation to comply with valid or
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differently, the Constitution did not bar Oregon from enforcing its blan-
ket ban on peyote possession, which, in turn, permitted denial of unem-
ployment claims of persons who used peyote in religious ceremonies.57
Beginning with Sherbert v. Verner,58 when reviewing free exercise chal-
lenges, the Court has applied a balancing test known as "strict scru-
tiny."59  Under this test, a government policy, law, or regulation,
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or requires)
conduct that is contrary to his religious practices.").
57. Id. at 874, 890.
58. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that South Carolina's conditioning of the availability
of benefits upon a Seventh-Day Adventist's willingness to violate a cardinal principal of
her religious faith not to work on the Sabbath effectively penalized her right under the
Free Exercise Clause). Sherbert is a signature decision of the Supreme Court under the
chief justiceship of Earl Warren (1891-1974) from 1953 to 1969, which era many assess as
liberal or progressive. The case is considered "the cornerstone of federal free-exercise
law." GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIoUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 113 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). And one of the reasons minority groups regarded the
Warren Court "as the special guardian of their place at the American table." Id. at 115.
The decision's author was none other than Justice Brennan, a judge noted for his "ready
sympathy for the ordinary American facing the coercive power of the state," and one who
is praised as "the intellectual spark plug of Warren-era liberalism." Id. at 115, 121-22. The
same Brennan inspired the revival of state constitutional law that took place in Oregon and
many other states during the 1970's. With the federal judiciary turning conservative during
this period, Brennan advised activist lawyers that the golden age of federal civil-liberties
litigation was now over, and that, in bringing claims, they should first look to their state
constitutions. His point was that the increasingly conservative federal courts had no juris-
diction to contradict state court rulings interpreting state constitutions given that such
cases, in legal parlance, would not present a "federal question" that would justify the inter-
vention of federal courts. See id. at 121-23. In Sherbert, the Court did not hold that a
burden on free exercise was something flatly forbidden by the Constitution. "Instead, it
measured the denial of benefits by a test it imported from its cases on freedom of speech:
the state could [burden a religious practice if and only if it] was pursuing some compelling
state interest and it could further show that no alternative forms of regulations would
achieve the same end." Id. at 116. Here, the only recognized governmental interest the
Court found was South Carolina's desire to prevent false claims or save money by denying
a religious claim for unemployment compensation. But, in the assessment of the Court,
this did not rise to some compelling interest, given that the grant of an exception for Mrs.
Sherbert, the Seventh-Day Adventist whose religious practice South Carolina burdened,
would not destroy the state's ability to protect the fund from fraud. Id. Note that the rule
of accommodation for minority religion the case established occurred over strong dissent
of two judges, Justices John Marshall Harlan and Byron White. Both believed the ruling
went too far. They argued that by treating nonreligious and religious claimants equally, the
state had fulfilled its constitutional duty. Id.; see Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 420 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
59. Strict scrutiny is the highest among three standards of constitutional review
United States courts apply in challenges of laws or regulations relating to fundamental
rights and suspect classifications. Examples of fundamental rights calling for application of
strict scrutiny are marriage and procreation, interstate travel, the right to vote, access to
justice, and, relevant here, the right to free exercise of religion. THOMAS R. HENSLEY,
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imposing a substantial burden on religious practices is upheld only if it
served a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly-tailored to
achieve that end.6° Instead, under the new rule the Court's majority held
that "neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious prac-
tices even when not supported by a compelling government interest. 61
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 610, 612 (1997). Examples of suspect classifications in-
clude race, challenges relating to affirmative action programs, and sometimes, alienage. Id.
at 610; see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that States could not
deny welfare benefits to aliens). Not all alienage classifications invite strict scrutiny. In-
stead, some, such as classifications or challenges involving matters of public employment
get rational basis evaluation, while others, such as those involving public education are
assessed under intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SUL-
LIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 720-25 (13th ed., 1997). The two other tests, not relevant
here, all of them lower than strict scrutiny, are the rational basis and intermediate scrutiny
approaches. Rationality review affords only minimal scrutiny of a classification or policy
under challenge; such classification or policy passes constitutional muster if there is a legiti-
mate government interest at stake and the means used to achieve that interest are ration-
ally related to the interest. Because this test defers to the judgments of policymakers, a
classification or policy reviewed under the test is normally upheld. The burden of proof is
also upon an individual challenging an affected government policy to show that there can
be no conceivable basis for the policy or classification, something often not easy to do. See
id. at 635-62. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a classification or policy under chal-
lenge is upheld as constitutional if there is an important governmental objective involved
and the classification or policy is substantially related to the achievement of the objective.
Like strict scrutiny and unlike rational basis, the burden is upon the government to prove
that the classification in question serves important governmental objectives and is substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives. See, e.g., id. at 681-720.
60. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Due to the place Sherbert holds in the
Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence, strict scrutiny is sometimes referred to as the
Sherbert test. In the aftermath of the case, and until Smith II, "[c]onstitutional lawyers
came to consider the 'compelling interest test,' . . . as the basic template for deciding ques-
tions under the Free Exercise Clause." GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ON TRIAL 116 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). Cases generally recog-
nized as progeny to Sherbert include: Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (invali-
dating Wisconsin's mandatory school attendance law as applied to Amish parents who
refused to send their children to school on religious grounds); Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (striking down Indiana's denial of
unemployment compensation to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job because of his relig-
ious objections to war); and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals .Comm'n of Florida, 480
U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (upholding the unemployment compensation claim of an employee
whose religious beliefs had changed during the course of her employment). As the Court
itself concedes in Smith II, these cases stand for "the proposition that where the State has
in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases
of religious hardship without compelling reason." Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith II),
494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
61. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (analyzing Smith II). As Profes-
sor Epps extrapolated, the new rule meant that "if a law didn't target religion, then minori-
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Justice Scalia stated that the correct meaning of "free exercise" was
that it protects religious worshipers only against laws specifically aimed at
religious practice.62 When a case concerned an "across-the-board crimi-
nal prohibition on a particular form of conduct," he said, "the sounder
approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our prece-
dents, is to hold the [Sherbert] test inapplicable., 63 He claimed the only
instances in which the Court had found a neutral, generally applicable
law unconstitutional were "hybrid" cases, involving "the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as free-
dom of speech and of the press ... or the right of parents.., to direct the
education of their children." ''6 Scalia said courts applying the Sherbert
test to neutral, generally applicable laws "would open the prospect of
constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind,",65 and destroy the power of the government to
make rules for society. Although Americans value and protect religious
diversity and divergence, "we cannot afford the luxury of deeming pre-
sumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation
of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.",6 6 He
said religious minorities penalized or outlawed by "neutral laws" should
take their case to Congress and the state legislatures which could, if they
choose, protect their religious practice, rather than look to the courts for
accommodation. 67 Scalia conceded that "leaving [religious] accommoda-
tion to the political process will place [minority religions] at a relative
disadvantage," but saw that as an "unavoidable consequence of demo-
cratic government [that] must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance
of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."'68 Responding to
Justice O'Connor's contention that there should be "nothing talismanic
about neutral laws of general applicability,, 69 Justice Scalia replied,
"[o]ur conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that
have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be
ties whose practice was destroyed were out of luck." GARRETTn Eps, To AN UNKNOWN
GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 224 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
62. Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith I1), 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
63. Id. at 884-85.
64. Id. at 881-82.
65. Id. at 888.
66. Id.
67. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 890.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's point was that all laws
burdening religious practices be subjected to strict scrutiny, given that "the First Amend-
ment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and
freedom of speech a 'constitutional norm,' not 'an anomaly."' Id.
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justified by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach com-
patible with these precedents."7°
Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion71 , while three other Court
members, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall outrightly dis-
sented.72 O'Connor asserted that strict scrutiny should have been applied
in the case, and she disagreed with the contention that accommodation of
minority religions is now something left to legislatures and the political
process.7 3 Concerning the first point, O'Connor stated that the First
Amendment
does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and
laws that target particular religious practices. Indeed, few States
would.be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening
a religious practice as such. Our free exercise cases have all con-
cerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly
burdening a religious practice. If the First Amendment is to have any
vitality, it ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and hy-
pothetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious
practice.74
She assessed the rule on neutral, generally applicable laws Justice
Scalia laid down in Smith H to be a "sweeping result," that is accomplish-
able only by "a strained reading of the First Amendment," and a disre-
gard of the Court's "consistent application of free exercise doctrine to
cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious con-
duct."75 She pointed out that in Yoder, the Court "expressly rejected the
interpretation [it] now adopts" in Smith,76 and lambasted the factors Jus-
tice Scalia recounted in the case for not applying the Sherbert test as a
"parade of horribles."77 In short, Justice O'Connor considered Sherbert a
70. Id. at 886 n.3.
71. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 904.
74. Id. at 894.
75. Id. at 892.
76. Id. at 895-96 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972)) (stating that
"[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitu-
tional requirements for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion").
77. Smith I1, 494 U.S. at 902. Justice O'Connor stated that this parade of horribles
"not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest test, it instead demon-
strates just the opposite: that courts have been quite capable of applying our free exercise
jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state in-
terests." Id.
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valid and workable test in both unemployment and non-unemployment
cases.
[T]he sounder approach-the approach more consistent with our role as
judges to decide each case on its individual merits-is to apply this test in
each case to determine whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs
before us is constitutionally significant and whether the particular crimi-
nal intent asserted by the State before us is compelling. Even if, as an
empirical matter, a government's criminal laws might usually serve a
compelling interest in health, safety, or public order, the First Amend-
ment at least requires a case-by-case determination of the question, sensi-
tive to the facts of each particular claim.78
Concerning Justice Scalia's claim that accommodation of minority reli-
gions be left to the political process, Justice O'Connor stated that the
First Amendment was enacted "precisely to protect the rights of those
whose religious practices are not shared by the majority... [J,79 and that
"the history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious
groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish." 80 To Justice
O'Connor, the best way to preserve the Bill of Rights was to use the
Sherbert test and decide free-exercise challenges on a case-by-case ba-
sis.81 For all the flaws O'Connor noted in the Court's reasoning, she still
concurred with the majority because she believed the case did not war-
rant strict scrutiny; instead, in her assessment, Oregon has a compelling
interest in proscribing the use of certain drugs according to its own drug
laws.82
78. Id. at 899.
79. Id. at 903.
80. See id. at 903 (invoking for support the statement of Justice Jackson in W. Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943), to the effect that "[t]he very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of politi-
cal controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections").
81. See id. at 903. "The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's man-
date of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. For
the Court to deem this command a 'luxury' ... is to denigrate '[t]he very purpose of a Bill
of Rights."' Id. at 888.
82. Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 905.
Oregon's criminal prohibition represents that State's judgment that the possession and
use of controlled substances, even by only one person, is inherently harmful and dan-
gerous. Because the health effects caused by the use of controlled substances exist
regardless of the motivation of the user, the use of such substances, even for religious
purposes, violates the very purpose of the laws that prohibit them. Id.
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun indicated that strict scrutiny
applied in this case. 83 Because Oregon "could not constitutionally en-
force its criminal prohibition against respondents," its interests in this
matter does not rise beyond the "fear of false claims," and "it cannot
justify its denial of unemployment benefits."84  Concerning Justice
Scalia's indication that judicial solicitude for minority religions is now at
an end, Justice Blackmun stated he did not "believe the Founders thought
their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution a 'luxury,' but an
essential element of liberty-and they could not have thought religious
intolerance 'unavoidable,' for they drafted the Religious Clauses pre-
cisely in order to avoid that intolerance.
8 5
B. Post-Mortem Analysis
In a work published on the eve of the Smith case, Professor Laycock
warned "[i]f the Supreme Court focuses too narrowly on drugs in this
case and misses the larger issue of religious ritual, it could create a devas-
tating precedent for religious liberty."86 The Supreme Court failed to
In the apt assessment of Professor Epps, "O'Connor's concurrence reads more gently than
Scalia's harsh manifesto, but it provided no more comfort to the [Native American]
Church, and indeed probably less. Scalia at least was saying to religious groups that they
were all in the same boat, at the mercy of the lawmakers. O'Connor's soothing tone
seemed to reassure ordinary Americans that their liberties were safe; it was only 'drug
users' who were in danger from the law." GARRETr EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIG-
IOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 223 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
83. See id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Among other things, the dissent bitterly
accused the majority of "mischaracterizing this Court's precedents," "discarding leading
free exercise cases ... as 'hybrid,"' "effectuat[ing] a wholesale overturning of settled law
concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution," and assuming a "distorted view of
our precedents." Id. at 908.
84. Id. at 921. The dissent contended that Oregon's regulatory interest justifying the
denial of benefits is not distinguishable from the interest the Court rejected in earlier
precedents in Frazee, Hobbie, Thomas and Sherbert. All of these cases, except Frazee,
were discussed in supra note 60. In Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S.
829 (1989), the Supreme Court relied on Sherbert and its progeny to unanimously reverse
the disqualification of benefits for a claimant whose refusal to accept employment requir-
ing that he work on Sunday was not based on his membership in "an established religious
sect or church," but instead only on his claim "that, as a Christian, he could not work on
'the Lord's day."' Id. at 830.
85. Id. at 909.
86. Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 876, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886.
Laycock believed "the Native American use of peyote has substantial parallels to Christian
and Jewish uses of wine." Id. at 876. He criticized the decision of the Supreme Court to
grant review in the case as an "exercise of judicial activism." Id. at 877. Judicial activist
judges or courts use their power of interpretation and judicial review to checkmate "the
activities of Congress, state legislatures, and administrative agencies when those govern-
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heed Laycock's prescient warning. The decision also revealed Scalia's ju-
dicial philosophy as "a lawyer skeptical of the transformative power of
law, [and] a jurist uneasy with judicial authority."87 Epps points to an-
other aspect of Smith I: the accession to power of conservatives on the
Court did not have to spell a negative outcome for religious freedom.88
In sum, three features of Smith II that have formed the basis of criticisms
of the decision are (a) its misreading of Supreme Court precedents relat-
ing to the Free Exercise Clause, particularly its claim that strict scrutiny is
inapplicable in "neutral, generally applicable laws" that have an "inciden-
tal" impact on religious conduct; (b) its indication that solicitude for mi-
nority religion is something now left to the political process, or "a matter
of politics, [rather than] law";8 9 and (c) the fact that the rule relating to
so-called neutral, generally applicable laws the decision laid down was
mental bodies exceed their authority." STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT AND PoLrIcs TODAY 471 (2005). Judicial activist judges or courts tend to be liberal,
but here, going against the grain of conventional wisdom, the Court assuming this role is
conservative. See id.
87. Richard Nagareda, Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 739 (1987). Nagareda also uncannily stated
[t]hough frequently set forth in 'conservative' terms, Justice Scalia's jurisprudence in
administrative and first amendment law calls for substantial change in existing legal
doctrines. The impetus for this change stems from his tendency to view the substan-
tive issues in a given case through the prism of the institutional constraints on courts
within the scheme of representative government. For Justice Scalia, the Constitution
does not give a mandate to the judiciary to ensure perfect government. That responsi-
bility rests with the formal mechanisms of the representative process.
Id. at 738-39; see also GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUs FREEDOM ON
TRIAL 216 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (pointing out, "[ljike most of Scalia's
major opinions, [Smith If] was radical in its approach and less than respectful of Supreme
Court precedent"). As Professor Epps well sums up the matter, in Smith II, Justice Scalia
"helped the Court mold ... a case that would let him get rid of Sherbert, a case he didn't
like. The Court's crown prince had struck another blow. Religious freedom, after Smith,
was a whole new game. And Nino Scalia set the rules." Id. at 224. Epps indicates that
going back to the first Smith case, Justice Scalia took a keen interest in this litigation. See
id. at 179.
88. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 166 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). As Epps explains, "[i]n general, conservatives tend to
be friendly toward religious belief and to admire small religious groups that cling to their
faith against the secular tide of contemporary society." Id. After all, Chief Justice Burger,
a conservative wrote the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which "voided the convictions of
an Old Order Amish couple who refused to send their children to public school beyond the
eighth grade." Id.
89. Id. at 220. As Epps poignantly indicated, Americans, both those who go to church
frequently and those who do not, "are used to hearing public officials speak respectfully
about [their] piety and wisdom .... They are not used to being told that their freedom
depends on the legislature's whim or to hearing that the courts have no interest in hearing
from individuals oppressed by the political process." Id. at 221.
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never briefed and argued, as mandated under the United States adver-
sarial system, before its announcement by the Court. The first two
grounds were the bases for the disagreement by Justice O'Connor and the
three justices in dissent who opposed the Court. The same is also true of
the numerous critics who have written commentaries on the case. 90 The
remaining point to which we turn next is that, unlike in some free exer-
cise claims where an argument preceded adoption of a change in stan-
dard,91 in Smith II, the Court perpetrated a "doctrinal shift," embodied in
the discard of strict scrutiny, that was "neither briefed nor argued."92 In-
stead, "Smith II took the parties by surprise in the sense that neither the
state Attorney General nor any of the parties anticipated that the Court
would use this case as a vehicle for recasting the standard governing the
evaluation of a claimed violation of free exercise. ''93
90. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the
Amicus Brief that Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99 (1990) (contending that Smith
was "inconsistent with the original intent, inconsistent with the constitutional text, incon-
sistent with doctrine under other constitutional clauses, and inconsistent with precedent");
Indian Religion: Must Say No, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 25 ("During Prohibition, the
large Catholic minority won congressional support for communion wine. Now apparently,
a smaller minority simply takes its lumps."); Samuel Rabinove, The Supreme Court and
Religious Freedom, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 25, 1990, at 19 ("[H]istory tells us
that unpopular religious minorities, such as Mormons or Jehovah's Witnesses, have had
problems with legislatures that were insensitive, if not hostile, to their concerns. Under the
Supreme Court's ruling the free exercise clause no longer protects against such eventuali-
ties."); Nat Hentoff, Justice Scalia vs. The Free Exercise of Religion, WASH. POST, May 19,
1990, at A25 ("Almost in time for the celebrations of the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights,
Justice Scalia has interpreted this quintessential part of the First Amendment to be a
majoritarian rule rather than a protection of individual conscience."); Edwin Yoder, A
Confusing Court Ban on Peyote's Ritual Use, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1990, at
3C ("In theory, all religions are equal under the First Amendment; but in the eyes of the
[C]ourt, some are clearly more equal than others. Alcohol, the sacramental element of
choice for Christians and Jews, is allowable; peyote, the element of choice for Indians, is
not."). For a listing of commentaries defending the decision, though not always its reason-
ing, see STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 861 (2001) ("notes on the fallout from
Smith"). Some of the harshest criticisms, such as the one by Hentoff, were directed per-
sonally at Justice Scalia. Nat Hentoff, Justice Scalia vs. The Free Exercise of Religion,
WASH. POST, May 19, 1990, at A25.
91. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT 480 (2001) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)). There the Court
rejected a free exercise challenge to a requirement in federal welfare programs that appli-
cants for benefits be identified by social security numbers. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986).
92. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT 480 (2001).
93. Id.; accord, GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON
TRIAL 216 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (commenting on the reactions of the
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III. FOUR AFTERMATHS OF SMITH
In the aftermath of Smith, State and Federal governments enacted four
significant measures: (1) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) (coupled with the decision in City of Boerne v. Flores); (2) the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) of 1994; (3) amend-
ments to Oregon's Controlled Substance Act; and (4) the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).9 4 Each episode pre-
dated publication of Epps's book; however, the work did not cover the
RLUIPA. Since the Smith story is incomplete without considering the
RLUIPA, the law is incorporated here as an update to Epps's narratives.
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and City of
Boerne v. Flores
The first aftermath of Smith is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) of 1993. 91 The statute was praised as "the most important con-
gressional action with respect to religion since the First Congress pro-
Attorney General's Office following publication of the Smith case, "what they were realiz-
ing is that the Court had done something no one had asked or expected it to do. All of the
state's arguments, all of Smith and Black's counter arguments, were couched in terms of
the 'compelling interest' test of Sherbert v. Verner."); id. at 219 (stating, for the lawyers, as
well as the plaintiffs, "[t]he entire case had taken place within the context of the Sherbert
test."); id. at 150 (commenting on how Dean Jesse Choper of Berkeley's Boalt Hall School
of Law, Frohnmayer's old constitutional-law professor and a leading authority on church-
state issues, flatly told assembled lawyers in a strategy session that followed receipt of
certiorari for Smith II, "to forget any thought of challenging Sherbert. The Court was wed-
ded to it..."); id. (stating that based upon Choper's advice, "Frohnmayer and his subordi-
nates worked on the assumption that Sherbert would be the framework under which the
case would be decided."). An attempt after the fact by the coalition of interest groups that
fought to overturn Smith in Congress to correct the lack of argument and briefing on "neu-
tral, generally applicable laws" through rehearing, turned out to be medicine after death.
The Court easily rejected the request for a rehearing in a one-sentence order it released on
June 4, 1990. See id. at 229. However, the issue of whether the rule on "neutral, generally
applicable laws" touching on the Free Exercise Clause laid down in Smith II should have
been briefed and argued beforehand refused to go away, as the dissents of Justices
O'Connor and Souter in the Flores case convey.
94. There is no suggestion that the four occurrences treated here exhaust the universe
of events that attended the legal and constitutional tsunami that the Smith case signified,
for they do not. See, e.g., STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 923-32 (2d ed. 2001)
(documenting a number of important occurrences preceding the passage of the RLUIPA,
some of which occurrences informed the crafting of the act and discussing the proposal for
a Religious Liberty Protection Act, in 1998 by the 105th Congress, along with arguments
against such a law); see also id. at 908-923 (reproducing text of a testimony by Professor
Douglas Laycock given on October 1, 1997 to the Senate Judiciary Committee, discussing
possible congressional responses to Flores).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2005).
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posed the First Amendment, 96 and evolved as Congress's "direct
response" to Smith H.9 7 Although many in Congress independently as-
sessed the case to be wrongly decided, in passing the law, Congress acted
mostly out of pressure from cross-sections of the American public who
were outraged by the Smith case. In addition to analysts who wrote in
scholarly and popular media savaging the decision,98 these entities in-
clude religious organizations of every description and civil rights groups.
Appearing to take to mind the advice of Justice Scalia in Smith II that
religious accommodation was now something left to the political process
rather than to unelected federal judges, these groups pressed Congress to
restore religious freedom, by reinstating the strict scrutiny standard or the
Sherbert test.99 Congress obliged them with the passage of the RFRA.
Based on Congress's power to enforce civil rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1°° the bill sailed quickly through Congress, 1 ' and President
Clinton wasted no time in signing it into law on November 16, 1993.
Smith prompted governmental action that infringed upon religious exer-
cises.10 2 The best-known case, You Vang Yang v. Sturner, involved autop-
sies conducted by the government.'0 3 Sturner involved the Hmong, a
Southeast Asian immigrant group in Rhode Island, for whom autopsies
96. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 243 (1994).
97. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997).
98. See, e.g., STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 861 (2001); Douglas Lay-
cock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief that Was Never
Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99 (1990); Indian Religion: Must Say No, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6,
1990, at 25; Samuel Rabinove, The Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, June 25, 1990, at 19; Nat Hentoff, Justice Scalia vs. The Free Exercise of
Religion, WASH. POST, May 19, 1990, at A25; Edwin Yoder, A Confusing Court Ban on
Peyote's Ritual Use, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1990, at 3C.
99. KENNETH JANDA ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 484 (8th ed. 2005). Professor Janda and his colleagues, in their popular textbook
on American government, praised the political response to Smith as "an example of plural-
ism in action[.]" Id.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids States from deny-
ing anyone within their borders "the equal protection of the laws." Id. But the specific
section from which Congress drew its authority in enacting the law is section 5, which
stipulates that "[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5.
101. KENNETH JANDA ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 484 (8th ed. 2005). The legislation passed unanimously in the House of Repre-
sentatives and by a 97-3 margin in the Senate. Id.
102. See id. ("At first the coalition failed to rouse much public interest in a case in-
volving the use of hallucinogenic drugs. But as government infringements on religious
practice mounted, public interest and legislative reaction soon meshed.").
103. 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990).
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meant that the spirit of the deceased remained on earth to torment its
family rather than find its way to heaven.' °4
The RFRA was enacted with the aim of voiding Smith's holding that
"the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).""'1 5 Consistent with this goal, the statute's
stated purposes was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert... and... Yoder,... [,] and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."1 °6 The
act also goes beyond these purposes "to provide a claim or defense to
persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by govern-
ment."1 °7 The RFRA forbade "the government from substantially bur-
den[ing]" a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability," unless the government can demonstrate
that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental inter-
est; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."10 8 Finally, to ensure effectiveness in resolution
of the evil the law was designed to cure, the scope of the law was broad,
covering any "branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official
(or other person acting under color of law) of the United States," as well
as to any "State, or .... subdivision of a State."10 9
In sum, the RFRA conveyed to the Court that Smith was incorrectly
decided. The statute's very title, "Religious Freedom Restoration Act,"
suggests that the Court erred by taking away something of value belong-
ing to somebody else that needed reinstitution.110 One reporter who
104. See You Vang Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990); see also S. 2969,
102d Cong. §§ 2-3 (1992).
105. Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith 11), 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2005).
107. Id.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)&(b) (2005).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (2005); see also U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2005) (specifying
that the RFRA "applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law,
whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after [the RFRA's
enactment])."
110. S. 2969, 102d Cong. §§ 2-3 (1992) (emphasis added). In addition to the stated
purposes of the act, there were also other statements, suggesting error by the Supreme
Court and Justice Scalia as author of Smith. For example, the expressed findings of Con-
gress, underlying enactment of the law, stated, among other things, that in Smith, "the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens
on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion," and that "the compelling
interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a) (2005) (emphasis added). Notice that the last finding parallels Jus-
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called to inform Frohnmayer that the Supreme Court has announced its
decision in Smith, indicated that the Court "t[ook] away" religious free-
dom.111 Through the RFRA, Congress worked to bring back the free-
dom the Court took away. This would have been a story with a good
ending if the matter had ended there. But instead, whatever victory for
religious freedom the RFRA symbolized, it turned out to be short-lived.
One inauspicious occurrence that pointed to that non-permanence-as
well as the ability of the Supreme Court to laugh last and best-was City
of Boerne v. Flores,11 released four short years after enactment of the
RFRA. In Flores, the Supreme Court, per Justice Kennedy, invalidated
the RFRA on the ground that Congress exceeded its enforcement powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the law, particularly as ap-
plied against the States. 1 3 The Court reasoned that Congress lacked any
"substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment," '114
invoking the history and design of the amendment as well as case law; 115
that congressional power to enforce under the Fourteenth Amendment
does not encompass "the power to determine what constitutes a constitu-
tional violation;" '116 and that the exclusive power to interpret and define
the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment was something that be-
longed to the judiciary, rather than Congress. 117 Three justices, Justices
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith H to the effect that "[tihe Court's parade of
horribles ... not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest test, it instead
demonstrates just the opposite: that courts have been quite capable of applying our free
exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
state interests." Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith I), 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Subsequent events contributed to reinforce,
rather than ameliorate, that sense of error attributed to Scalia and the Court. For example,
in a declaration accompanying his signature of the bill into law, President Clinton stated,
"this act reverses the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division against Smith and
reestablishes a standard that better protects all Americans of all faiths in the exercise of
their religion in a way that I am convinced is far more consistent with the intent of the
founders of the nation than the Supreme Court decision." DAVID E. WILKINS & K.
TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INDIAN
RIGHTS: THE CASE OF Oregon v. Smith 240 n.25 (2000). He also enjoined, "Let us respect
one another's faiths, fight to the death to preserve the right of every American to practice
whatever convictions he or she has...". Id. See also GARRETT Epps, TO AN UNKNOWN
GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 233-34 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
111. Id. at 215.
112. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (overturning an appeals court's ruling rejecting a city's denial
of a Catholic Church's request, anchored on the RFRA, to expand its growing parish into
the city's historic district).
113. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
114. Id. at 527.
115. See id. at 520-26.
116. Id. at 519.
117. Id. at 536.
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O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter, disagreed with this judgment.11 8 In addi-
tion to her comments to the effect that Smith was wrongly decided," 9
Justice O'Connor also pointed out that the provisions of the RFRA did
not directly or indirectly abridge the religious rights of any group or indi-
vidual; instead, they sought to accommodate the individual rights of ad-
herents of minority religions whose religious practices conflict with
generally applicable law.120
Flores signified the Supreme Court's "brisk[] reject[ion] [of] Con-
gress's attempt to tell it how to rule on religious-freedom issues.",12' The
idea animating sponsorship of the RFRA was that the power to enforce
under the Fourteenth Amendment "would allow Congress to enact a rule
of decision for free-exercise cases that would, by going beyond the mini-
mum protection set by Smith, guarantee the integrity of the First Amend-
ment right.' 122 But, as indicated, the Supreme Court saw the matter
differently.'23 The difference between Flores and Smith was that the
118. Flores, 521 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor's dissent was lim-
ited to the disposition of the case. Id. She agreed with the majority that the RFRA was
unconstitutional, but was dismayed that the Court used Smith "as a yardstick for measuring
the constitutionality of the RFRA." Id. at 545. O'Connor said she "remain[ed] of the view
that Smith was wrongly decided, and I would use this case to reexamine the Court's hold-
ing there." Id. at 544-45. Left to her, she "would direct the parties to brief the question
whether Smith represents the correct understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and set
the case for re-argument." Id. at 545. Justice O'Connor believed "[i]f the Court were to
correct the misinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause set forth in Smith, it would simul-
taneously put our First Amendment jurisprudence back on course and allay the legitimate
concerns of a majority in Congress who believed that Smith improperly restricted religious
liberty. We would then be in a position to review RFRA in light of a proper interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause." Id. Justice Souter, in his own dissent, raised "serious doubts
about the precedential value of the Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence." Flores,
521 U.S. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting). Like Justice O'Connor, he believes the merits of the
Smith rule need briefing and argument, adding: "I am not now prepared to join Justice
O'Connor in rejecting it or the majority in assuming it to be correct. In order to provide
full adversarial consideration, this case should be set down for re-argument permitting ple-
nary reexamination of the issue." Id.
119. Id. at 544-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 544-65.
121. GARRET-r Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIous FREEDOM ON TRIAL 235
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
122. Id. at 232.
123. For an eloquent and thoughtful critique of the Flores decision, see K. G. Jan
Pillai, In Defense of Congressional Power and Minority Rights Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 68 Miss. L.J. 431 (1998). Professor Pillai lamented the Rehnquist Court's
reinterpretation of the scope of Congress's enforcement power as a "perilous course ...
not redeemable by the text, design, or history of the Amendment or by the Court's own
carefully evolved precedents." Id. at 516-17, 435. Professor Pillai is of the view that given
its status "as the coordinate, if not the preeminent, and certainly the most democratically
accountable, branch of our government," Congress is entitled to a "measure of judicial
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opinion was not written by Justice Scalia, much criticized for authoring
Smith,'24 but rather by Justice Kennedy, a judge with a reputation for
level-headed views on the Court. 125 This meant that the Smith doctrine is
back as the law of the land. 126 Flores represented an intriguing occur-
rence, considering that in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hi-
aleah,'127 decided in 1993, the Court appeared to be inching its way back
deference" that "should be at least equal to the deference the Court customarily accords to
legislative interpretations of agencies charged with the administration of federal statutes."
Id. at 435 (implying this is something not present in this instant situation). For Professor
Pillai's comments, as they relate to minority rights on the matter of insensitivity to minority
religions, see infra Part IV.C.2.
124. See Richard Nagareda, Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 739 (1987); STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE iii
(2001); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus
Brief that Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99 (1990); Indian Religion: Must Say No,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 25; Samuel Rabinove, The Supreme Court and Religious Free-
dom, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 25, 1990, at 19; Nat Hentoff, Justice Scalia vs.
The Free Exercise of Religion, WASH. POST, May 19,1990, at A25; Edwin Yoder, A Confus-
ing Court Ban on Peyote's Ritual Use, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1990, at 3C.
125. Kennedy, with Justice O'Connor, wielded "swing" votes that decided the out-
comes on many critical issues during the era of the Rehnquist Court, from 1986 to 2005.
Justice O'Connor's retirement from the Court leaves out Kennedy, comparably more con-
servative than O'Connor, now as the lone swing or middle justice on the new Roberts
Court. See, e.g., David G. Savage, D6jA Vu Once Again, 92 A.B.A. J. 12 (2006) (noting,
"[t]his year, with O'Connor's retirement, Kennedy stood alone in deciding the outcomes in
the most divisive cases"). None of the other justices on the Court fills this swing bill,
certainly not former judge Samuel A. Alito Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit who replaced O'Connor.
126. The problem with this reasoning is that it suggests a choice for the Supreme
Court limited only to strict scrutiny, in the Free Exercise area, signified by Sherbert and its
progeny; and no strict scrutiny, especially in "neutral, generally applicable laws," as Smith
signified. But matters can be more complicated, as a case like Lukumi teaches. Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Also, even with the
Supreme Court's finding of RFRA as unconstitutional, traces of the act abound within the
United States. Many states have adopted RFRAs. See STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE
STATE 897 (2d ed. 2001) (failing to specify which States have adopted the RFRAs). One
commentator has argued that these state RFRAs and the RFRA, to the extent it remains
constitutional with respect to the federal government, should be viewed as imposing a
"common-law exemption model." Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious
Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999). Under that model, "courts decide in the first
instance whether an exemption is to be granted. But because RFRAs may be revised by
the legislature, the courts' decisions aren't final. Ultimately, the tough calls will be gov-
erned by the political process, just as they have been in the common-law system under
which American law has generally evolved." Id. at 1469.
127. 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (unanimously invalidating supposedly "neutral, generally ap-
plicable" ordinances of the City of Hialeah in Florida prohibiting the ritual slaughter of
animals, upon the finding that the ordinances targeted religious practices of the Santeria
sect, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause).
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toward strict scrutiny, "without admitting that it is doing any such
thing. 128
In retrospect, Congress's option to ground the enactment of the RFRA
on the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than
on the customary commerce clause,129 was, as Professor Epps points out,
"a risky strategy," given past attempts by the Supreme Court to limit con-
gressional enforcement power, particularly with respect to racial equal-
ity.1 3° This dubious history of restriction was a reason why the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was grounded on the power of Congress to regulate
"interstate commerce." Congress argued in the legislative history of the
act that discrimination was bad for business in America, because it made
traveling, eating in restaurants, buying gasoline, and so forth, more diffi-
cult and dangerous for black Americans. The Supreme Court had little
128. See GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIoUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 236
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). Professor Epps assessed that "Lukumi was an
easy case, even after Smith" which the Court did not treat as easy. Id.
Instead, it went through a laborious parsing of the law, as if laying out for lawyers and
judges the way to strike down laws affecting religion, even after Smith .... Having
finally concluded that Smith did not apply, the Court then applied the Sherbert test,
which, it said, Smith had not 'watered down' ... Kennedy's opinion suggest that Smith
might not apply in many cases: where laws specifically mention religious practice
alone. In those cases, Sherbert is still the rule. Lukumi seem[s] to suggest that the
Court had learned something from the reaction to Smith . . . . Now, after Lukumi,
balancing was back, and the test was so strict that good lawyers would be able to find
dozens of ways of arguing that their clients' cases were not covered by the Smith rule.
Some observers suggested that there might not ever be another Smith-style case; the
opinion in Lukumi offered ways for courts to get out of applying the harsh Smith rule
to any real factual situation that might arise. Id. at 237-38.
Although released only in 1993, Lukumi was working its way up through the federal courts
when Smith I was decided. Justice Scalia cited the case, albeit incorrectly, in making his
case for neutral, generally applicable laws requiring no exemption on religious grounds. Id.
at 236. He called the Hialeah ordinance under challenge "animal-cruelty laws," when, in
fact, the law was aimed against ritual sacrifice. See id. (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith
(Smith I), 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990)) (pointing out that "[t]he Hialeah ordinance, in fact,
was the closest thing imaginable to Scalia's hypothetical law against bowing down to
golden calves"). A case like Lukumi arguably serves to reinforce the point before regard-
ing the non-wisdom of a premature discard of the RFRA as dead law. See generally
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes").
130. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 232
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
131. See generally ROBERT D. LOEVY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964: THE PASSAGE
OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 178-79 (1997). It is instructive to point
out that one reason Congress chose the Commerce Clause over the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was that it permitted the leaders of the Senate to refer the bill to the Commerce
Committee, then chaired by Senator Warren Magnuson, a pro-civil rights liberal from
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problem in accepting this argument-and upholding the act. 132 True,
"bad for business" was a far less noble basis for a civil-rights law, com-
pared to a moral commitment to human equality, but it worked. So why
did the coalition of interest groups opposing Smith, joined by Congress,
prefer to anchor religious freedom on civil rights rather than the com-
merce clause, especially given the obstacle embodied by the fact that the
decision the coalition sought to overturn was one of constitutional inter-
pretation rather than one of statutory interpretation? 133 The answer is
the coalition's reasoning that civil rights were by now so deeply rooted in
American law that the Court would not reject a measure that guaranteed
a right that most Americans regarded as inviolable. It was a reasoning,
however, that turned out to be a big mistake.13 4
Washington, rather than the Judiciary Committee, then chaired by James Eastland, an anti-
civil rights white supremacist from Mississippi. Id.
132. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). I use the terminology "little problem" advisedly because
Justice William Douglas penned a concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel in which he
indicated he would rest his decision both on the commerce clause and section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279-80 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Douglas said his "reluctance" to rest solely on the commerce clause "is not
due to any conviction that Congress lacks the power to regulate commerce in the interests
of human rights. It is rather my belief that the right of the people to be free of state action
that discriminates against them because of race,... 'occupies a more protected place in our
constitutional stem than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state
lines."' Id. (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)).
133. The nature of the distinction is as follows. Overturning a decision is common in
cases involving interpretation of congressional statutes, since the theory here is that be-
cause Congress wrote the statute, it has the right and power to amend the statute, when it
believes the Court has misinterpreted it. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIG-
iOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 230 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). In contrast, over-
turning or legislative revision of a constitutional decision is more difficult and much less
common. See id. at 229-30. In these instances, short of an amendment to the Constitution,
the Court has the final word on the Constitution's interpretation. Id. Smith was a decision
of constitutional interpretation, not interpretation of a congressional statute. Id. at 230.
The fact that the coalition proceeded to overturn in spite of this dilemma is why Professor
Epps correctly assessed the strategy to overturn in this case as "audacious." See id. at 229.
134. See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (demonstrating an attempt
to legislatively overrule a decision by the Supreme Court). Smith is not the first time in
recent memory that Congress and the Supreme Court have engaged in this tangle. Id. In
Bell, the Court ruled that only the specific department or program receiving government
funds, not the institution as a whole, was barred from discriminating. Id. at 473-74. De-
spite Congress's attempt to restore and expand civil rights enforcement, the Supreme
Court weakened it again. In City of Richmond v. Croson, a plurality of the Court held that
past societal discrimination alone does not justify what it called a quota. See City of Rich-
mond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). The Court restricted minority contractor set-
asides of state public works funds, something it had approved in 1980. Id. at 477. In 1991,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, designed to reverse or alter a string of twelve deci-
sions narrowing the scope of national civil rights protections that the conservative majority
THE SCHOLAR
B. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) of 1994
A second consequence of Smith is the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act (AIRFA) of 1994.' The act was an amendment to the Ameri-
can Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978,136 and ranked, along with the
RFRA, as part of Congress's direct response to the second Smith case.
Ideally, Congress enacted the RFRA to protect religious freedom for all
Americans, Native Americans as well as non-Native Americans. How-
ever, a separate law for Native Americans was needed because the
"RFRA, by its terms, addressed the legal problems of many religious
groups potentially affected by Smith II," but failed to "clearly provide
protection for" practitioners of peyote religion. 137 The movement for re-
ligious freedom that emerged in opposition to Smith, which included
Congress, was interested in protection of religious freedom that did not
necessarily embrace minority religions. 138 The answer to these problems
was a separate law that would provide stronger and more specific statu-
tory protection for the religious practices of Native Americans. 139
That law was the AIRFA, 14 ° legislation sponsored by Senator Daniel
Inouye (D-Hawaii). The statute provided, in pertinent part, that
"the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be
prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be
penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, posses-
sion or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of other-
wise applicable benefits under public assistance programs. ,141
The law includes several exceptions, some of which are that it does not
preclude the Drug Enforcement Administration from making "reasona-
on the Supreme Court issued in the period between 1989 and 1991. President George H.
Bush signed the bill into law after vetoing a measure the previous year similar to the one
he signed. Only time will tell what the Supreme Court does with this law.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
136. Id.
137. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 1016 (1998).
138. Why did Congress seem to work at cross-purposes, one part not interested in
protecting minority religions, and the other part interested enough to realize the amend-
ments here at issue? The answer is that Congress is a non-monolithic entity of two cham-
bers and over 500 members susceptible to the demands of the innumerable interest groups
in the society, pushing and pulling it in different directions.
139. See generally Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establish-
ment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 1291 (1996).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (1994).
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ble regulation and registration" of persons who cultivate, harvest, or dis-
tribute peyote; it does not preclude prison authorities from prohibiting
access to peyote by Indians incarcerated in Federal or State prison facili-
ties; it does not preclude States from passing and enforcing "reasonable
traffic safety laws or regulations"; and that it does not preclude the Secre-
tary of Defense from making "regulations establishing reasonable limita-
tions on the use, possession, transportation, or distribution of peyote to
promote military readiness, safety, or compliance with international law
or laws of other countries," provided such regulations are "adopted only
after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for
which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice." '142
The statute, in the list of findings underlying its passage, named Smith
and indicated that the ruling "raised uncertainty whether the religious
practice would be protected under the compelling State interest stan-
dard." '1 43 It also pointed out that "while at least [twenty-eight] States
have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in conformance with, the
Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote by Indian
religious practitioners, [twenty-two] States have not done so, and this lack
of uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in
such religious ceremonies." '144 Congress also noted that "for many Indian
people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious
sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant
in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures[,]"' 45 and that "since 1965, this
ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by Federal regu-
lation[.] '' 14 6 It also finally found that "the lack of adequate and clear le-
gal protection for the religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to
stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the
risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment. ' 147 The effect
of the law is that, "[f]or the first time in its history, the Native American
Church stood on firm statutory ground. ' 148 But AIRFA allowed the fed-
eral government to decide the membership of the Native American
Church. 149 This means, as Professor Epps pointed out, that the law
would protect a challenger like Al Smith, but not Galen Black. 5' Carv-
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(2)-(7) (1994).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(4) (1994).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(3) (1994).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(1) (1994).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(2) (1994).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(5) (1994).
148. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 235
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).




ing out a separate law to protect the religious freedom of Native Ameri-
cans proved a blessing in disguise for Native Americans in 1997 when the
RFRA was struck down by the Supreme Court, and the AIRFA, being
independent of the RFRA, was left untouched. 5' This is partly the sense
in which, as Epps draws from the Scriptures "[t]he stone that the builders
rejected has become the cornerstone" of God's house. 52
C. The 1991 Amendments to Oregon's Controlled Substances Act
A third result of the Smith case consists of the amendments to Ore-
gon's Controlled Substances Act. In rewriting the jurisprudence of the
Free Exercise Clause in 1990, the Supreme Court stated that protection
for minority religious freedom was something left for the political pro-
cess,' 53 implicitly inviting state legislatures to provide the protection for
peyote religion that it could not grant. One of the first legislatures in the
country to accept this invitation was the Oregon Legislative Assembly.
In 1991, in its first meeting following release of Smith II, the Assembly
amended Oregon's Controlled Substances Act designed to facilitate sac-
ramental use of peyote. The law exempts from prosecution any defendant
able to show, as an affirmative defense to a charge of peyote possession,
that he or she possessed the peyote as part of a practice associated with a
"good-faith religious belief," and that the intended use was safe for both
the user and onlookers. 154 State Representative Jim Edmunson (D-Eu-
gene) sponsored the bill and Al Smith helped lobby its passage.1 55 Ore-
gon's Attorney General did not take a position on the bill.156
In Oregon, the law provided a layer of protection to religious freedom
for Native Americans beyond the AIRFA. It also added Oregon to the
list of the dozens of jurisdictions that afforded exemption to "use, posses-
sion, or transportation," of peyote for religious purposes. 57 With this
151. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
152. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOuS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 240
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (quoting Psalms 118:23-23 (reading: "The stone which
the builders rejected has become the head of the corner. This is the Lord's doing; it is
marvelous in our eyes.")).
153. See Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith I1), 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
154. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (West 2006) (outlining how the statute relates to the
prosecution for the manufacture, possession or delivery of peyote).
155. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 234-35
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
156. Id. at 235.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1)-(7) (1994). The clause in quote tracks the language of
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1994. Id. While use and possession seem
obvious, transportation is also implicated in cases involving the use of peyote for religious
purposes. See, e.g., GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON
TRIAL 117-18 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (citing Oregon v. Soto, 537 P.2d
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law, Oregon shed its dubious distinction as "the only state in the Union
whose courts... reject[ ] a religious defense to its peyote statutes, 158 and
took an important step aimed at repairing its past insensitivity to minority
religions. The initiative takes particularly sweet meaning when it is con-
sidered the alternative course Oregon could have chosen but consciously
rejected in passing this law. The House of Representatives, in a report
accompanying the RFRA that it compiled, stated,
In terms of the specific issue addressed in Smith, this bill would not
mandate that all states permit the ceremonial use of peyote, but it
would subject any such prohibition to the aforesaid balancing test.
The courts would then determine whether the State had a compelling
governmental interest in outlawing bona fide religious use by the Na-
tive American Church and, if so, whether the State had chosen the
least restrictive alternative required to advance that interest. 159
As Epps interprets this statement, "the drafters were saying, the Smith
rule was being overturned-except maybe not for peyotists .... [T]his
language in the committee report seemed to hint rather broadly that
other courts should do the same. '160 Oregon deserves accolade for tak-
ing a course, as it did, that departed from this House invitation.
D. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) of 2000
The final aftermath of the Smith case, not treated in Epps's book, but
included here as an update to the Smith story, is the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000.161 The act "is the
latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise
142 (Or. 1975)) (involving Reginald Soto, a Native American adherent of peyote religion,
pulled over by a state police car). Soto had a "medicine bundle" hanging from his rearview
mirror. Id. at 118. The bundle contained dried out peyote button. Id. Like many Native
Americans, Soto carried the button, not for ingestion, but to have his God near at all times,
in the same way, for example, Roman Catholics would carry small statues or images of the
Virgin Mary on their dashboards. Id.
158. Id. at 117. The case exemplifying this practice was Oregon v. Soto where the
Oregon Court of Appeals ruled a defendant's free-exercise arguments irrelevant. In decid-
ing not to consider such arguments, the court stated:
Peyote and mescaline have been declared by the legislature to be dangerous drugs as a
matter of law. The preservation of the health and safety of the people is the presumed
purpose behind that legislative declaration and a valid and reasonable application of
the criminal laws of the state. There is, thus, a compelling state interest. Id. at 118-19.
159. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 234
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
160. Id.
161. See generally Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000).
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heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent
with [the Supreme] Court's precedents."' 62 It signified Congress's re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's invalidation of the RFRA in Flores. The
RLUIPA has one key property the ill-fated RFRA lacked: it invoked fed-
eral authority under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. As the Su-
preme Court itself unanimously assessed in Cutter v. Wilkinson, the
RLUIPA was "[l]ess sweeping than RFRA[.]', 1 63 The law has two parts:
a section dealing with "protection of land use as religious exercise," 161
and one on the protection of religious exercise of institutionalized per-
sons. 1 65 The first protects property used by religious groups, including
remedy for religious communities experiencing conflicts with zoning
boards; the second protects religious practices of institutionalized per-
sons, such as individuals in prisons and nursing homes. President Clinton
signed the bill into law on September 22, 2000.166
Section three, the provision of particular interest and relevance here,
provides, in pertinent part, that "'[n]o government shall impose a sub-
stantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or con-
fined to an institution,' unless the burden furthers 'a compelling
governmental interest,' and does so by 'the least restrictive means."1 67
Section three was designed "[t]o secure redress for inmates who encoun-
tered undue barriers to their religious observances . . . " and its passage
followed congressional hearings spanning three years, documenting "friv-
olous or arbitrary" barriers that impeded the religious exercise of institu-
tionalized persons.168 The act defines "religious exercise" to include "any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief.' 1 69 Section three applies when "the substantial bur-
den [on religious exercise] is imposed in a program or activity that re-
ceives Federal financial assistance," or "the substantial burden affects, or
162. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (2005).
163. Id.
164. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 § 2 (2000).
165. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 § 3 (2000).
166. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIoUs FREE-
DOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT 534 (2001).
167. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2114 (2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
1(a)(1)-(2) (2005)).
168. Id. at 2119 (summarizing the legislative history of section three). That history
includes the anticipation of lawmakers that courts entertaining complaints under section
three would accord "due deference to prison administrators' experience and expertise."
Id. at 2115.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2005).
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removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign
nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.' 170 Under the
Act, "[a] person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a govern-
ment."17' In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court, per Justice Gins-
burg, unanimously upheld this section against an Establishment Clause
challenge by prison officials in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction. The Court granted review in the case "to resolve the
conflict among Courts of Appeals" on the question whether section three
"is consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.'
172
The Court handily answered the question in the affirmative, incorporat-
ing the assessment, as indicated above, that the RLUIPA itself is "[l]ess
sweeping than RFRA[.]' '1 7 3
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE Epps's STUDY
There are three elements to the importance of the Epps's work or
study.'74 The first is a continuation of the commentary describing the
book's general features. The second is a chapter-by-chapter description
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(2) (2005).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2005).
172. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2115 (2005).
173. See id. at 2118. Justice Thomas was the only one of the nine judges who, in
addition to voting with the Court, also authored a concurring opinion. Id. at 2125
(Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas agreed with the rest of the Court that the RLUIPA "is
constitutional under our modern Establishment Clause case law," but concurred specifi-
cally "to explain why a proper historical understanding of the Clause as a federalism provi-
sion leads to the same conclusion." Id. (emphasis added). This is not the first time
Thomas, who advocates an "original intent" of the Religion Clauses, is propagating his
unique federalism interpretation of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that although
States are bound to observe strict neutrality, they "should be freer to experiment with
involvement [in religion] on a neutral basis than the Federal Government (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))); Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (maintaining
that "[t]he text and history of Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is a federalism
provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments," and
indicating that the Clause "does not protect any individual right"). In Zelman, a five-
Justice majority of the Supreme Court upheld a Cleveland, Ohio, school voucher program
under which students were given government tuition aid, which could be used to attend
public or private schools, including religious schools. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639 (2002). In Newdow, a five-three majority of the Court rejected Michael Newdow's
standing to challenge statutes exposing his daughter to daily recitations of the Pledge of
Allegiance in her public school. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004).
174. The term work or study is used advisedly because the discussion here, as in other
portions of this book review, is on the totality of Professor Epps's research on the Smith
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of the book's contents or organization. The third and final portion is an
articulation and analysis of three lessons that, in my assessment, individu-
ally and collectively bear on the book's significance.
A. General Features of the Book
Epps's book takes its title from a passage in the Holy Scriptures where
the Apostle, St. Paul, preaching to the Athenians, commented on an altar
the latter dedicated "to an unknown god." '175 It is a title that also reso-
nates well with the remarks of the protagonist Smith about praying to
"[a] God that [he] didn't even understand., 176 The resort to titles drawn
from biblical passages for names of works is a tradition now well en-
trenched in American legal scholarship that the book under review taps
into.177 The cover of the book is graced by footage of a golden eagle
feather descending or about to descend on some courthouse that resem-
bles the building of the Supreme Court, both shrouded within the back-
ground of pre-storm clouds. An eagle "is one of the most sacred symbols
in Native spirituality., 178 It is a symbol that speaks to the religious color-
ation of the dispute here involved, but also, as well, an invitation for
Smith to step forward and represent Indian interests in the brewing law-
suit over religious rights. And when Smith accepted the large manila en-
velope with no return address that was put in his interoffice mailbox,179
he also committed himself to fight. 8 ° An eagle feather, albeit quiescent
rather than descending, is also the pictorial legend that graces the non-
chaptered portions of the book, such as the "Note on Sources, "181
"Notes,"' 82 "Acknowledgments,"' 83 and "Index.' '184
case, as opposed to just the book under review, without in any way minimizing the impor-
tance of the book.
175. See Acts 17:22-23 ("Men of Athens, I perceive that in every way you are very
religious. For as I passed along, and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an
altar with this inscription: TO AN UNKNOWN GOD.").
176. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 19 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
177. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 3 (1979). The particular
passage in the Bible inspiring Professor Bell's work is from the book of Jeremiah, which
states in part that "[t]he harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved."
Jeremiah 8:20. Less dramatically, Bell, in a recent work, called the United States Constitu-
tion "America's civil religion." DERRICK A. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: Brown v. Board of
Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform 3 (2004).
178. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 110
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
179. Id. at 109-11.
180. Id. at 110 ("If I accept these feathers, how can I not go [to a peyote
ceremony]?").
181. Id. at 263-67.
182. Id. at 269-76.
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The book is divided into a prologue and fourteen chapters. In addition
to these features, the work also has a "Note on Sources," a type of biblio-
graphical essay of secondary sources built primarily on interviews of the
major parties in the litigation; "notes" or documentation; acknowledg-
ments; and an index of the names and subjects covered in the work. One
of the numerous persons Epps acknowledged in his book was David
Frohnmayer, of whom Epps said: "Frohnmayer, first as my dean and then
as president of the University of Oregon, has never tried to influence my
views or conclusions about the case, which are substantially different
from his own." '185 The prologue is a preview of two (out of the four)
parties, the Smith and Frohnmayer sides, weighed in the balance, in this
fateful lawsuit that "would come to define the limits of America's relig-
ious freedom." '186 Discussion relating to the organization of the rest of
the book is saved for section IV.B. infra. As the presentation in that
section makes evident, the discussion in the chapters well reflects and
harmonizes with the title or theme of each chapter. Also, like the book's
general title, many of the subtitles or themes-such as the "valley of the
shadow," "the wisdom of Solomon," "five smooth stones," "appeal to
Caesar," "sins of the fathers," "human sacrifice," and "Gideon's
army"-are topics drawn from the Bible. Both general title and chapter
themes, in turn, tie snugly into the book's subject matter of religious free-
dom. To crown and magnify these features, the book is, unlike much of
traditional legal scholarship, readable. Prior to his present call and incar-
nation as law professor, Epps was a former reporter for The Washington
Post and author of two novels. This background seems to have shaped
the quality of the legal narrative embodied in the book as well as the
readability of the work.
B. Organization of the Work
Chapter 1, titled "A God I Didn't Understand" provides details of
Smith's personal life growing up among the Klamath people of southern
Oregon. Native Indians are America's aboriginal population that White
America considers "vanishing. ' 187 But rather than vanish, this one, who
183. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 277-79
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
184. Id. at 281-89.
185. Id. at 277; see also id. at 953 (disclosing that Frohnmayer "helped bring me to the
University of Oregon," but also indicating that he "has been scrupulous about allowing me
to come to my own conclusions while answering my questions fully.").
186. Id. at 7, 10.
187. Whites sometimes have tried to accelerate this "inevitable" process through vari-
ous blatant and subtle means, one of them arguably the federal government's "termina-
tion" of the recognition of sovereignty accorded some of these Indian groups, as was the
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grew up without a father, thrived enough to write his name into Ameri-
can history. 8 ' "When Americans in the 1990s talk about religious free-
dom, they are, whether they know it or not, talking about Al Smith."' 18 9
Although born into a largely intact culture, Smith was, like generations of
Indian boys and girls, torn away from his home and sent to boarding
school to be assimilated into the American melting-pot. The result was
that he grew up not learning his own language, and the history and rituals
of his people. "Stripped of these things, he graduated from boarding
school to alcoholism, petty crime, prison, and disease."'1 90 But after
twenty years abusing alcohol, Smith, in January 1957, sought sobriety in
the recovery program of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).' 9' One of the
important steps in AA treatment requires the recovering alcoholic to
seek help in a "higher power."' 92 The higher power Smith embraced was
an Indian Creator that, as a child, he remembered his grandmother pray-
ing to.193 The title also sits and ties well with the general topic of the
book, drawn from the Holy Scripture, about a tribute to an unknown god.
case with the Klamath, who were terminated in 1976 and the rich timberlands of their
reservation sold off. Id. at 10. The termination was withdrawn one decade later, in 1986,
and federal government recognition reinstated. See id. at 49-52.
188. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 10 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). The bland name (Al Smith) that Smith received at
birth is one that clashes with his appearance. Id. at 8. In his days serving table, Smith took
on the nickname "Red Coyote" to match his Native features-and make up somewhat for
his lack of an Indian name. Id. Smith worried that when he is dead, he will arrive at the
spirit world and provide his name only for the spirit people to answer, "We never heard of
any Al Smith." Id. at 9. As Professor Epps elaborated, Smith and other Indian children's
not having a "true" name "is almost certainly a legacy of the 19th-century period of super-
vision by federal Indian agents, who decided that 'normal' American names would make
record-keeping easier than the descriptive Klamath-language names their wards were ac-
customed to." Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment
Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 963 n.46 (1998).
189. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIoUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 10 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 46. Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is an organization founded in June 1935
by Bill Wilson, "a former stockbroker who drunk away his career and nearly died from
drinking." Id. at 101. Wilson wrote the Twelve Steps, regarded as the "big book" in AA
program. Id. at 46. AA bases its alcoholic treatment and recovery program on abstinence,
which are much more about ways of not drinking. Id. at 42.
192. Id. at 42. AA literature teaches that recovering alcoholics need to rebuild them-
selves from the ground up as moral beings. Id. It warns that becoming sober without un-
dergoing a spiritual rebirth is far more agonizing and destructive than continuing to drink.
Id.
193. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment
Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 955 (1998) (quoting Interview by Garrett Epps
with Alfred L. Smith.) ("Finally, I got around to taking a look at the Twelve Steps, and I
heard them read over and over at every [AA] meeting... [Y]ou have to turn your life over
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Chapter 2, "Valley of the Shadow," presents the life story of David
Braden Frohnmayer. "In worldly terms ...Frohnmayer's life seemed
worlds away from Al Smith's."194 Born into a solidly middle-class home,
"Frohnmayer early in life established a pattern of success that has hardly
been broken since." '1 95 These include sound elite education, stable mar-
riage, rewarding legal practice, a stint in legal teaching, and a successful
dabble into politics culminating in election as attorney general in 1980,
and reelection into the same position in 1988. As attorney general,
Frohnmayer built a reputation "as a tenacious defender of the state's le-
gal interests and an outstanding appellate advocate."'196 He was also an
individual who "took pride in his office's reputation as a credible and
serious advocate before the Court,"'197 and whose conduct in office for a
time made him "the most popular and respected political figure in the
state."' 198 But all of these successes foreshadowed demons at home that
the genial attorney general and his wife battled against, most evident in
the affliction of their two daughters with Fanconi anemia (FA), a life-
threatening genetic disorder. 199 These children later died from complica-
tions of the disease.2" But there is something of a silver lining to these
personal tragedies, embodied in the possibility that Frohnmayer may, in
the end, be remembered as much for what he did as attorney general as
to the care of God as you understand God. And I said, "Oh, well, screw that God."...
But I'll try to remember my grandmother's God, because I could remember my grand-
mother used to pray in Indian every night, pray all over the house. So that will be my God,
a God that I didn't even understand.)
194. Id. at 966 (going on to describe the tragic turn of events when Frohnmayer's
three children were each born with a life-threatening disease).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 967.
197. Id.
198. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 968 (1998).
199. Id. at 966-67. Guido Fanconi, a Swiss pediatrician, is the namesake for the FA
disease. Id. at 966 n.55. A recessive gene causes this extremely rare disease. Id. at 966.
Because the bone marrow of individuals who have this condition over time ceases the
creation of both red and white blood cells and of all platelets, the disease eventually causes
bone marrow failure. Id. FA patients also have a higher incidence of leukemia and cancer
than the general population. Id. By studying chromosomes doctors can diagnose the FA
disease, which separate and rearrange easily in an FA patient. Id. at 966 n.55. A child
whose parents both carry the recessive FA gene has a one in four chance of being born
with the disease. Id. at 966-67 (drawing on LYNN & FROHNMAYER, FANCONI ANEMIA: A
HANDBOOK FOR FAMILIES AND THEIR PHYSICIANS 3 (2d ed. 1995)).
200. GARRETTI Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 247-48
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (explaining that Kirsten, born in 1973, died in
June 1997 and Katie, born in 1978, died in Sept. 1991). Frohnmayer left politics after Ka-
tie's death in September of 1991, and resigned his position as attorney general at the end of
1991 to become dean of the University of Oregon School of Law. Id. at 247.
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for what he contributed and is contributing to the search for a cure for
201Fanconi anemia.
Chapter 3, "The Last of the Klamaths," continues the story of Al
Smith, focusing, this time, on what he did to earn a livelihood after em-
bracing sobriety. The campaigns for Indian self-determination during the
1960s and 1970s led by the likes of the American Indian Movement
(AIM) and Edison Chiloquin, produced many effects, including the resto-
ration of tribal status to the Klamath, by Congress, in 1986; and the foun-
dation of Sweathouse Lodge, an alcoholism and drug-abuse facility for
Native Americans.2 °z Rather than take his share of the money collected
from the sale of timber in Indian reservations, Chiloquin, "the last of the
Klamaths," this chapter used as theme, chose to build a tipi (some kind of
shelter for peyote church services) and light a sacred council fire that he
said would burn until the land taken from the Klamath people by white
America had been restored to Indian ownership. Part of the results of
these struggles was the incorporation of Indian religious practices, evi-
dent in traditions or institutions, such as sweat lodge,20 3 the Sun
Dance,204 the Native American Church, 205 and peyote worship, into Na-
201. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment
Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 967 (1998) ("In 1989, [Frohnmayer and his wife]
founded the Fanconi Anemia Research Fund, Inc., to organize research and treatment ef-
forts to deal with the disease .... While continuing to serve as attorney general, [he] also
flew to medical conferences and research seminars, becoming a recognized lay expert on
bone-marrow transplantation and diseases of the blood. He abandoned plans to run for
governor of Oregon in 1986 in order to spend more time with his family and devote his
energies to the search for treatments."). He later ran for that office in 1990 and lost. GAR-
RET Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIoUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 245 (The Notably
Trials Library 2005) (2001).
202. Id. at 52-53 ("[The facility enabled Native people to] adapt[ ] the Twelve Steps,
discarding the dominant-culture overlay in the field of treatment, and experimenting with
their own spiritual traditions of treatment for the modem plagues of whiskey and drugs.").
"Treatment at Sweathouse Lodge lasted [ninety] days." Id. at 53. As coordinator, Smith's
job was "to meet with new clients, orient them to the program, and assign them to a coun-
selor." Id. Smith also brought in Stanley Smart, the Road man or peyote ceremonial
leader who introduced tipi (church services at which peyote was served as sacrament) at
Sweathouse Lodge. Id. at 65. Professor Epps assessed that the facility was "a vibrant
experimental facility that probably could not be re-created in today's insured, regulated,
professionalized environment." Id. at 53.
203. See id. at 46 ("Indian people all over North America-everywhere except for the
desert Southwest-had known and used the sweat lodge for hundreds of 'ears. It was a
way of purifying the body and the spirit; the sweat seemed to carry off much of the dross of
daily life, leaving those in the lodge strengthened in their efforts to change and improve.").
204. See id. at 2, 54 ("A four-day event, it is usually not open to spectators or casual
seekers. Dancers cut a sacred tree and carry it into a circular arbor, where they erect it in
the center. The next day at daybreak, the dancers gather and tie colorful 'prayer ties' to
the tree, and dancing begins. Men who are not dancing gather around a sacred drum,
while women sing to accompany the dancing."). Native people find the dance "a powerful
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tive treatment programs. As an alcoholism counselor, Smith became fa-
miliar with and used these experimental programs or practices, all of
which helped solidify his Indian personality and rooted-ness in Native
tradition and religion. This chapter also incorporates a useful discussion
on the nature of Indian religion and the tendency by white Americans,
going back to Thomas Jefferson, to view Native religion as "devil wor-
ship," rather than real religion. Further discussion on this point is saved
for Part IV.C.3, focusing on insensitivity to minority religions.
Chapter 4, "East of Eden," continues the story of Frohnmayer started
in Chapter 2, from a new angle. Specifically, it is the story of a religious
commune, Rajneeshpuram, in Antelope, western Oregon, whose activi-
ties in the guise of religion consumed Frohnmayer's time during his first
term in office as attorney general and shaped his view about how religion
change, something that, in turn, both influenced his response to the Smith
case and formed the basis for his "killer argument" during oral argument
in the case at the U.S. Supreme Court. The commune took its name after
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, an East Indian philosopher and supposed
"holy man", whom his followers considered a "progressive guru." The
group incorporated the ranch it established its commune on into a city to
get around Oregon's stringent land-use regulation system. Following the
incorporation, the leaders of the commune changed the name of the city
from Antelope into Rajneesh(puram) and renamed its streets after Hindu
holy men. "The Rajneeshees wanted to be left alone, but they persisted
in persecuting those around them; when they got their hands on power,
they used it as a club against anyone who differed from them. They
screamed that their enemies were bigots while they themselves deployed
election fraud, poison, and germ warfare., 20 6
In response to the request of an Oregon legislator, Frohnmayer wrote
an attorney general's opinion that ruled that the incorporation of
Rajneeshpuram as a city violated the federal and state constitutions and
being unconstitutional, the city must cease to exist. Frohnmayer based his
expression of healing and union with the earth." Id. But it is also a tradition most whites
do not understand, and that some white missionaries for some reason considered frighten-
ing or ungodly. Id. Sun dances were forbidden on reservations, but the ritual survived in
secret-until the 1960s and 1970s when it emerged as one of the most sacred expressions of
the new Indian spirituality. Id. at 55.
205. Id. at 55. Its name which suggests one un-variegated entity is a misnomer, since
the Church "is actually a very loose confederation of denominations with differing ceremo-
nies and beliefs." Id. Just like the Sun Dance operates semi-underground, this institution,
"has kept a low profile by intent, both in American society generally and in Indian coun-
try" for one reason: "Many whites and Native people alike object to its ceremonies be-
cause they involve peyote." Id.
206. GARRET" Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIoUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 89 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
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opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Larkin v. Grendel's
Den.2" 7 The opinion concluded that Rajneeshpuram "is the functional
equivalent of a religious commune., 20 8 And as a religious body, it was
not eligible for any state funding: "[t]he state and federal constitutions do
not permit the road to Damascus to be paved with public funds. '20 9 In
the aftermath of this opinion, Rajneesh and his followers were convicted
of or pleaded guilty to various offenses unrelated to free exercise of relig-
ion and their community put on the real-estate market. For Frohnmayer
and many Oregonians, "the rise and fall of Rajneeshpuram framed the
issues of religious freedom and government neutrality in a stark and un-
forgettable way. ,210 The experience brought home to Frohnmayer "the
wisdom of the religion clauses," along with "the danger of the establish-
ment of a religion." 211 It convinced him that "religion could be a force
for evil as well [as] for good and that, no matter what religious leaders
claimed about the purity of their motives, the state might need to watch
them carefully indeed., 212 Epps assessed that Rajneeshpuram did not
end "in fire and blood," as was the case in places like Waco, Texas, due
largely to the "caution and adroitness" of Frohnmayer and other Ore-
gon's authorities.213
Chapter 5, "The Eagle Feather," traces the evolution of the contro-
versy that would form the lawsuit Employment Division v. Smith.214 It is
about all the original parties, Smith and Black, as employees, and Alco-
hol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT), as employer,
and the dispute over religious use of peyote that led to the relieving of
the two employees of their positions as alcoholic counselors. The contro-
versy would not have taken place-and the Smith cases would not have
entered into the constitutional history book-if ADAPT had stopped
short after firing Smith and Black. Instead, the agency (pig-headedly)
proceeded to oppose the dismissed employees's unemployment claims.
The case would also not have happened if Smith and Black had not
207. 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that gave churches and
schools the power to veto the issuance of liquor licenses to restaurants within 500 feet of
the church or school building as direct delegation of political power to a religious body,
"enmesh[ing] churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers").
208. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 80 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 67.
211. Id. at 88.
212. Id. at 89.
213. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIous FREEDOM ON TRIAL 67 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
214. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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met2 15-and there would have been no invitation, signified by the eagle
feather to Smith that formed the theme of this chapter, to represent In-
dian interests. There are several points that make this chapter significant.
The previous chapters have been about Frohnmayer and Smith. This
chapter brings into the discussion Black and ADAPT, the necessary par-
ties in the dispute over unemployment that led to the Smith case. The
other lessons, bearing on significance, are saved for Part IV.C.1, where
the topics properly belong.
Chapter 6 is entitled "Freedom of 'Religion."' The chapter discusses
different respects, beginning with the misspelling of religion, in which the
Oregon provisions relating to religious freedom, differ from the one em-
bodied in the federal constitution. The drafters of the Oregon constitu-
tion of 1857 were less educated than the framers of the United States
constitution-one reason, for example, why they spelled religion incor-
rectly. But they were also less idealistic individuals whose political phi-
losophy revolved around "majority rule," to the relegation of minority
rights. Their greater pragmatism is evident in the differentness between
their guarantees for religious freedom, compared to the provisions em-
bodied in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.216 The
pragmatism sired a vision of the state as a "neutral" force in religion,
specifically the view that the state has fulfilled its constitutional duty with
respect to religious freedom simply by disassociating itself from religion
and religious bodies altogether? 17 The State could find it has been drawn
into something unwanted by an apparently harmless exception to one of
its laws. 18 Several cases, old and recent, embody this trend. These in-
clude Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 19 decided in the first quarter of the
twentieth century, where the state defended its anti-Catholic initiative on
the ground that it did not favor any one denomination over another.
215. See GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GoD: RELIGIoUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 96
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001). Whether it was due to the sweat lodge or
Smith's general personality, "[o]ne person who responded to Al Smith's talk about Native
religion was Galen Black." Id.
216. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing for "the free exercise of religion"),
with OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3 (protecting the freedom "to worship Almighty God," "the
free exercise and enjoyment of religeous [sic] opinions," and the rights of conscience);
compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the government's "establishment of religion"),
with OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stipulating that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury
for the benefit of any religious [sic], or theological institution, nor shall any money be
appropriated for the payment of any religeious [sic] services in either house of the Legisla-
tive Assembly").
217. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 969 (1998).
218. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 128
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
219. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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More recent cases evidencing this trend of strict neutrality are Salem Col-
lege & Academy v. Employment Division,22° and Oregon v. Soto221 de-
cided in 1973. In Salem College, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that
only the legislature, not the courts, has the power to make exemptions to
tax laws that exempt independent religious schools.222 The case laid
down a sweeping rule by which, under the Oregon religion clauses, the
state could not exempt some religions and not another or otherwise dis-
tinguish between or amongst religious groups that had different struc-
tures, behaviors, and beliefs. Instead, the state must treat all groups as
equal, i.e. "if one group got a special deal, then all had to get the same
deal. ' 223 The decision "threw Oregon's unemployment system ... into
chaos until the legislature could assemble and write a statute that satisfied
both the Oregon constitution and the federal law." '22 4 In the second, the
same court rejected a religious defense to its peyote statutes. In so doing,
Oregon became the only State in the Union to reject this defense. The
occurrence also set it apart from states like California, where, going back
to 1964, in People v. Woody,225 the government allowed that defense.
The revival of state constitutional law, instigated by Justice Brennan
during the 1970s, ironically served to reinforce the State's neutral view of
religious rights. The orientation led to the emergence of a complex and
sophisticated body of case law that interpreted the Oregon constitution
"as a first resort,, 226 an occurrence "breathing new life into the Oregon
constitution., 227 One of the signature decisions of this period was the
Salem College case. What is ironic about the strict neutrality the revival
movement sired was that it led to less solicitude for religious rights rather
than embrace the expansive trend in federal jurisprudence represented by
Sherbert and its progeny. Justice Brennan advised activist lawyers to first
look to their state constitutions when bringing claims because the federal
judiciary had turned conservative. But Oregon, led by individuals like
Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, adopted revivalism to
promote a non-expansive view of religious rights and one less solicitude
of non-mainstream religions.
220. 695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985).
221. 537 P.2d 42 (Or. 1975).
222. Salem Coll. & Acad., Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985).
223. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 128
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
224. Id. at 127-28.
225. 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
226. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 971 (1998).
227. GARRE TT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 124
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
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Chapter 7 titled "The Wisdom of Solomon" analyzes the unemploy-
ment compensation dispute of Black and Smith against ADAPT, the
agency, once their employer that opposed their receipt of unemployment
compensation, before the Employment Division of the Department of
Human Resources in Roseburg, Oregon. The Solomonic wisdom the
chapter refers to was that of Robert Gruber, a hearings officer in the
department whose job involved refereeing challenges to state agencies'
decisions. Just as the biblical Solomon in his ruling in the case of the two
women contending over a child would split the child so each woman gets
a portion, Gruber's decisions were a compromise that gave something to
each of the parties. The two employees, in ingesting peyote in religious
ceremonies, the referee ruled, engaged in "a willful violation of reasona-
ble standards of behavior which the employer had a right to expect," but
under the precedents the Supreme Court established in Sherbert and
Thomas, Oregon had no "compelling interest" that would permit it to
deny them unemployment benefits.228 Gruber's ruling has all the appear-
ance of a reasonable middle ground that would have resolved the dispute.
However, ADAPT refused to settle for anything less than full vindication,
which for it meant denial of unemployment benefits to Black and Smith.
Accordingly, the agency appealed the rulings in 1984 to the Oregon Em-
ployment Appeals Board, the administrative body that reviewed all deci-
sions by hearing officers. The board found against Black and Smith.229
The denial of compensation made Black and Smith "aggrieved parties"
and gave them the right, under Oregon civil procedures, to appeal the
rulings directly to the Oregon Court of Appeals, and from thence to the
Oregon Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC), accepted the complaint against ADAPT for
wrongful discharge and discrimination. ADAPT settled the EEOC
claims, leaving the issue of religious freedom unresolved.
Chapter 8, titled "Five Smooth Stones," discusses the rulings of the Or-
egon Supreme Court, which decided in favor of the plaintiffs and against
228. Id. at 140. This was actually the ruling with respect to Smith. For Black, Gruber
ruled "the claimant's use of peyote was cause for great concern by the employer," but that
the "action was nonetheless an isolated instance of poor judgment[ ]" that "such incidents
do not constitute misconduct under [Oregon administrative rules]." Id. Speaking further
to the non-compelling nature of the evidence, the referee also pointed out that the record
"developed during the hearing had not suggested that false claims of peyotism were a wide-
spread problem." Id. (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 142. For Black, the board disagreed with the referee's finding that the
employee's action amounted to an "isolated act of poor judgment." Id. Instead, his ac-
tions in "violating the employer's rules" are so serious he committed "misconduct" and is
therefore not entitled to benefits. Id. For Smith, it ruled that "the use of mescaline is
illegal in Oregon," and that the religious context was simply irrelevant. Id. Mescaline is
one of the psychoactive ingredients in peyote.
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the Employment Division. The court ruled that the agency's action that
denied plaintiffs benefits did not violate the Oregon religion clauses
(given the state constitution's strict neutrality toward religions), but that
the denial was not compelling under the Sherbert test and therefore vio-
lated the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. Despite
the imbalance in legal resources between the plaintiffs on the one hand
and the Attorney General's Office on the other, "Al Smith and Galen
Black were now truly in the position of David, the shepherd boy armed
with only a slingshot and five smooth stones who went forth to fight a
ten-foot-tall giant."23 This was not good news for Frohnmayer who be-
lieved these decisions "compromised the state's interest in controlling the
use of hallucinogenic drugs."2'' This was the scenario in which the attor-
ney general requested and received the United States Supreme Court
permission to review the case. Still, members of the Native American
Church could have averted the brewing lawsuit if the Oregon Board of
Pharmacy would have adopted a rule exempting from its list of illegal
drugs the sacramental use of peyote. Instead, the Board amended the
rules regarding controlled substances creating an exemption for the Na-
tive American Church members to use peyote for non-drug purposes.232
However, they quickly withdrew the change upon the pressure of the at-
torney general, on the ground that the exemption would amount to an
unconstitutional establishment of religion in Oregon.
Chapter 9, "Appeal to Caesar," focuses on the oral arguments before
the Court in Smith L The "Caesar" the chapter refers to was no one else
but Justice Scalia, who filled the position left open when William Rehn-
quist was elevated to Chief Justice, and whose growing influence on the
Court the chapter dwells on. "Scalia had every reason to consider himself
the leader of a growing army of reliably conservative judges who would
set constitutional policy for a generation to come. "233 The strength of his
participation in Smith I was also proof of his continuing influence as intel-
lectual second-in-command to Rehnquist as a member of the conserva-
tive wing of the Court.
Chapter 10, "Sins of the Fathers," deals with the reactions by groups,
Native Indian and non-Native Indian, attending the decision by the attor-
ney general to seek a review following the remand of Smith I and the
Oregon Supreme Court's reaffirmation of its holding to the effect that the
First Amendment entitles Black and Smith to unemployment compensa-
230. Id. at 150.
231. See id. at 210.
232. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 154
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
233. Id. at 166.
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tion. These groups worried that "the wrong result in Washington might
harm Indian religions around the country.,2 34 Compelled by pressure
from several quarters, including Native Indian friends, Frohnmayer tried
to settle the case out of court, but the litigants, who did not have any
attorney-client relationship with the Native American Rights Fund in
Boulder, Colorado, an organization representing tribal governments and
Native organizations in the United States, found the settlement term un-
favorable and refused to settle.
Chapter 11, "Human Sacrifice," is the story of the event of oral argu-
ment in Smith II before the United States Supreme Court. Frohnmayer
presented his "killer argument" about how religions change and how,
therefore, peyote religion, even if safe now, might become unsafe in the
future, if granted affirmative constitutional protection. Lawyers for
Smith and Black had good counter-arguments, but the tenor of question
from the justices, particularly Justices O'Connor and Scalia, suggested
that the respondents could not win. Scalia posed a hypothetical about
human sacrifice, from which this chapter draws its theme that observers
considered disrespectful to Native Americans and their religion.235 The
chapter also makes the important point that, in retrospect, the oral
argument
was mostly striking for what was not said. Not one word from coun-
sel, not one question from the bench suggested that this case turned
on anything except the appropriate application of the Sherbert "com-
pelling interest" test .... Since its petition for certiorari ... the state
had not even suggested a new look at Sherbert. All the briefs in the
case took the test for granted, and no justice had suggested
otherwise.236
Chapter 12, titled "Incidental Burdens," presents an excellent and ex-
haustive discussion on the decision in Smith II that the Supreme Court
released on April 17, 1990, which decision, as indicated in this book re-
view, many berated for "tak[ing] away religious freedom., 237 The rule on
"neutral, generally applicable laws" is one that was also strongly con-
tested within the Court itself, although, as Professor Epps cannily shows,
234. Id. at 189.
235. Id. at 213. Craig Dorsay, attorney for Smith and Black, tried to argue that a
"state could not outlaw a religious practice without showing that it caused actual harm"
when Scalia cut him off with, "Well, I suppose you could say a law against human sacrifice
would, you know, would affect only the Aztecs. But I don't know that you have to make
... exceptions. If it is a generally applicable law." Id.
236. Id.
237. See GARRETTr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 215
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
THE SCHOLAR
Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence in the case read like a dissent, is a
"former state judge with a hardline view of drugs," who had little appetite
for peyote religion. 38
Chapter 13, titled "Gideon's Army," analyzes the fall-outs from the
second Smith case, which fall-outs or aftermaths, including events not
covered in the Epps's book, Part III of this book review comprehensively
analyzes. An important element of those aftermaths, which formed the
theme of this chapter, was whom the fragile coalition, which emerged in
opposition to the Smith case, excluded. "Like Gideon in the Bible, the
coalition felt the need to send away some of its potential recruits., 2 39 As
indicated before in this book review, the coalition was only interested in
restoring the compelling interest test, not in protecting peyote religion.
Its goal was to achieve protection for "mainstream" religions, while leav-
ing minority religions, such as the Native American Church, in the cold.
The coalition rejected the request by the leadership of the Native Ameri-
can Church to adopt, "as one of its objectives the repeal of Smith as it
applied to states' power to ban possession and use of sacramental peyote"
on the grounds that "peyote was controversial."24 It was a response Na-
tive Americans, understandably, viewed as ominous. As one Native
American leader recalled, "[t]hey asked the [Native American] church to
basically get their own coalition, get their own law. We felt snubbed." '241
Epps wrote, "[w]ith the losers in Smith safely in the background, the new
religious army marched into battle with a sound of trumpets. ' '24 2
Chapter 14, titled "Simple Gifts," presents an update on how, since the
Smith cases, all the four quarreling parties (including John Gardin, for-
mer head of ADAPT) moved on with their lives. Smith, now eighty-
something years old, is honored for his option to stand up and fight rather
than run away. There was no reason to ever worry that he would do
something-like turn away from a fight-that would make his children say
"[o]h, he's the guy that sold out. ' 24 3 And the fear is also banished for all
times that when he departs into the spirit world, his spirit people would
not recognize his name. Instead, he was the culture hero who, even
though warned, for example, that "he cannot win or that he should not
win or that he is too unimportant to fight the giant with only his five
smooth stones," still stood to fight "when the battle c[a]me[ ] uninvited to
his doorstep," strong in the knowledge that "no good comes from running
238. See id. at 223.
239. Id. at 230.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 230-31.
242. Id. at 231.
243. GARRE-r Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 204
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
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away." '244 Black still agonized that the real story of the Smith suit is yet to
be told. He still saw the dispute as a quarrel over how to treat Native
American alcoholics and still believed that "he was fired for doing his
job." '2 45 He is dismayed that "Oregon does not offer peyote religion as a
therapy for alcohol and drug abuse among its Native people., 24 6 Instead,
the treatment facility Sweathouse Lodge, in Corvaliis, one of the monu-
ments of the victories Native people won during the American Indian
Movement (AIM) upheavals of the seventies, had closed, "and nothing
ha[s] taken its place. '24 7 The chapter is themed around Frohnmayer and
the spotlight is on him and the major realignments that took place in his
life, including the loss of his two daughters to Fanconi Anemia, and his
departure from politics and option for life in academic administration,
first as dean of the University of Oregon law school and later as president
of the entire university system, while still retaining his position as profes-
sor in the law school. The title "simple gifts" that graced this chapter was
the Shaker hymn performed at the funeral of his daughter, Kirsten, the
second of two daughters to die from complications from Fanconi
Anemia. 48
In sum, judging from its plan or organization, Epps's book may be said
to be divisible into two parts and two time periods, each, incidentally, of
seven chapters: the course of events in the period when the litigation was
a local affair limited to Oregon borders, and occurrences from the period
the litigation went national. In the first period, the quarrel was mostly a
controversy over unemployment compensation, with religious over- or
undertones.2 49 The materials in the book devoted to this first period are
in Chapters 1-7. In the second period, the quarrel metamorphosed into a
controversy over religious freedom that originated as unemployment
claims. The materials in the book devoted to this latter period are Chap-
ters 8-14.
244. Id. at 257.
245. Id. at 277. Black's belief that the "real story" of the Smith controversy has not
been told is such that, as Epps indicated in his acknowledgments, "Galen Black is at work
on his own memoir of his experience with ADAPT." Id. There is no sign that the memoir
has come out.
246. Id. at 251.
247. Id. at 53.
248. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 249-50
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
249. See e.g., id. at 175 (stating that Smith I "seemed to be a routine unemployment-
compensation case, with the slightly exotic addition of Native religion[,]" that initially "at-
tracted little notice from the press or Court watchers.").
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C. Three Lessons Bearing on the Significance of the Book
Three inter-related lessons individually and collectively bearing on the
significance of the book are (1) the gulf in misperceptions and miscalcula-
tions that erupt into conflict; (2) the problem of majority insensitivity to
minority religions; and (3) the nature of the relationship between the
First and Fourteenth Amendments that the dispute exemplifies or
illustrates.
1. Gulf in Perceptions and Miscalculations that Erupt into Conflict
The first lesson, pointing to the significance of the book under review,
revolves around misunderstandings among the parties in a dispute that
can lead to conflict. Scholars have written about misperceptions-and
miscalculations-among actors in international relations that build up and
lead to conflicts, even wars.25° Similar misunderstandings that erupt into
conflict can and do occur in non-international settings. The controversy
that culminated in the Smith case is a good case in point. Distorted read-
ing of the "evil" intentions of "the other side, 251 is key in figuring out an
answer to the question, "why the state of Oregon, in the person of Dave
Frohnmayer, fought so long and so hard against allowing unemployment
benefits to two obscure former alcohol- and drug-abuse counselor," and
"the tenacity with which both sides pursued a dispute over a small
amount of money. "252 Numerous instances of misperceptions, ending in
conflict, occurred in the interactions between ADAPT and its two former
employees, as well as between Frohnmayer and Black and Smith, from
the moment the Attorney General's Office became involved in the
dispute.
i. Misperceptions in the Interactions Between ADAPT and Its
Two Former Employees
ADAPT believed that the use of peyote for church services by Smith
and Black changed its ability to counsel clients. 3 I look first at the na-
ture of the interactions, leading to conflict, between the agency and Smith
on the one hand, and next the interactions of the agency with Black, on
the other. In telling Smith not to attend peyote ceremonies, ADAPT
250. See, e.g., JOHN A. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONs Go TO WAR 251-65 (8th ed.
2001) (listing misperception of the parties, distorted views of the adversary's character, and
parties' misperception of their adversary's power, among others, as precipitating factors in
why nations go to war).
251. See generally id.
252. GARRETTr Epps, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 120
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
253. See id. at 117.
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chief executive John Gardin was ardent in his defense of the treatment
program's integrity.254 But Smith saw matters differently: that he can't go
to church.55 Smith's personality did not help matters one bit. For exam-
ple, Smith was somebody who did not fool around with white people,
particularly young white men who "reek of dominant culture., 256 More
specifically, he was a person, in a "lifelong fight for spiritual auton-
omy, '2 57 who "[s]ince his days in Indian school, had learned never to
walk away from a fight, never to give in to the spiritual demands of Amer-
ican life. Even when the issues were not clear, the stakes, to Al Smith,
were life itself.",2 58 Moreover, this was a fight he has not craved for, but
rather that "c[a]me[ I uninvited to his doorstep., 259 Nor did Smith's as-
sessment of unending oppression in the history of Native American inter-
actions with the majority white population help matters in any way.
When Gardin terminated his appointment, Smith not only protested:
"[y]ou go to church, and then you get terminated,, 2 6' he also blamed the
matter on "a continuation of being put down, of my people and our relig-
ion not being recognized by you newcomers."' 26 ' Epps wrote, "Indian
people, as a rule, don't much like to be told what to do by white people.
And if that's true in general, it's triply true of Al Smith, who had survived
for nearly seventy years by sheer stubbornness, a stem refusal to bow
down., 2 62 All the points above going to Smith's personality bespeak his
assessment of white domination perpetrated against Native Americans.
Stated somewhat differently, his personality in large part was shaped by
his assessment of white domination of Native Americans. This is also an
observation that points to the interconnectedness between discrimination
against minority religion and racism, discussed in the section that follows
below. A meritorious objection, in fairness to ADAPT, would be that
Smith was not hired because of his Native background, but because
ADAPT assessed he had job qualities, including the asset afforded by his
254. Id. at 106.
255. See id.
256. Id.
257. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIoUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 107
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
258. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 964 (1998) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1009
(stating, whether it was "with white people, with white religion, with alcohol, with disease,"
whatever it was, Smith fought rather than walked away from a fight, and it "was the legacy
he wanted to leave to his children").
259. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL 257
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 111.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 102.
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twenty-five years sobriety, that "would appeal to Native and Anglo cli-
ents alike." '263 Smith also knew full well that ADAPT would not consider
peyote as a alcohol treatment form. 2 6 4 But an equally meritorious
counter-argument would be that it is not asking too much to expect an
agency like ADAPT, which systematically reaches out to Native Ameri-
cans, the largest minority population in the county in which the agency
was located,2 65 to strive to accommodate the sincerely-held religious
practices of its otherwise dedicated employees.
As to ADAPT and Black, ADAPT again saw the issue as boiling down
around treatment philosophy.266 Gardin, chief executive of ADAPT, told
the referee who tried unsuccessfully to mediate the dispute, "[tihe issue
again is the ingestion of a drug, an illegal drug. Even if Galen believed it
was legal, by a recovering person, in any amount, we consider unaccept-
able from a treatment perspective. '2 67 To Black, in contrast, the issue
was his freedom of religion, particularly his freedom to pursue the "Na-
tive American way. "268 Black believed he was fired for doing what he
was hired to do, namely, "offer counseling in a multi[-]cultural manner so
as to make it effective for people of different backgrounds," and doing it
well.269 For him, "the primary issue" in the Smith controversy was that
"a dedicated drug counselor was fired for doing his job in a creative and
conscientious way," and he was at a loss about the dispute's transforma-
tion beyond these essential boundaries. 270 Black believed peyote might
be just as therapeutic and helpful for Native American clients the same
way Antabuse, the chemical the facility used to induce nausea when pa-
tients drank, is therapeutic and helpful for non-Indian clients; his role as
drug counselor, as he understood it, was that "we are obligated to provide
those people [Indian drug patients] their culturally specific treatment. "271
Told by Gardin to accept one of three options among returning to a
lower-level job, resigning, or being fired, Black rejected all three, blurting
out: "There's a court option, because what you're doing is simply racist
discrimination., 272 As the referee who attempted to mediate the dispute
263. Id. at 94.
264. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 94 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) ("When I went to work for them, did I consider
ADAPT would consider peyote a drug? Yes.").
265. See id. at 93, 99.
266. Id. at 135.
267. Id. at 137.
268. Id. at 135.
269. GARRETr Epps, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 134
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 99.
272. Id. at 108.
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recalled, "if ever two people were talking past each other, John Gardin
and Galen Black were. '2 73 Knowledge of Native spirituality was the cre-
dential that Black believed would make him more valuable to his employ-
ers. 274 Here too, as with Smith, personality or life experiences did not
help matters a bit, though to a lesser degree than Smith who rankled over
white mistreatment of Native Americans: His new way of life was one
which he would not abandon.2 75 To the very publication of the book
under review, Black remained unconvinced that the "real" story of what
happened in Smith had been told and believed he needed his own sepa-
rate story or memoir to relate that real story.2 76
ii. Misperceptions Leading to Conflict that David Frohnmayer
Contributed
The gulf and crisis in perceptions that characterized the Smith contro-
versy did not experience any narrowing from Frohnmayer's involvement
in the case. If anything, the attorney general's participation made matters
worse. First, Frohnmayer was a "tenacious defender of the state's legal
interests, who perceived the claims as brought forth by drug reform-
ers and civil libertarians.2 78 Another blinder impeding perception, laying
the ground for conflict, was the attorney general's conviction that Oregon
would be in a "major world of hurt" if Oregon granted exemption for
271religious use.  Until the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court the sec-
ond time, Frohnmayer underestimated Al Smith and Galen Black.28° In
seeking the Supreme Court's review a second time in the case, he also
ignored advice from a cross-section of Oregonians, including former col-
leagues in the University of Oregon law school, who counseled him not to
seek certification, out of a well-founded fear that the wrong result in
Washington might harm Native American religions around the coun-
273. Id. at 135.
274. GARRET-r Epps, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 99 (The
Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
275. Id. Epps wrote that Black "is, in his way, an American original, a spiritual seeker
who is also a genuine rolling stone," who, by the time he sobered up, took "on the weather-
beaten look of a man who has spent a lot of time on lonely roads .... This is a man who
has had some hard traveling to get where he is." Id. at 96-97.
276. See id. at 251, 277.
277. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 967 (1998).
278. See GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL
128-29, 148 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
279. Id. at 189 (quoting Frohnmayer, who, in referring to the Oregon Supreme
Court's response to the United States Supreme Court's remand of Smith I, stated, "[i]f we
couldn't take that case off the books, we were in a major world of hurt").
280. See id. at 128-29.
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try.2"' Like with Smith and Black, Frohnmayer's personality could also
have been a factor contributing to misperceptions, as these insightful
words illuminate:
Lawyers-all lawyers-like to win their cases; they are a self-selected
and carefully trained group of gladiators who fight for their clients'
rights as if their own lives depend on it. Lawyers also come, by the
working of human nature, to believe in the absolute rightness of
their cause. And even among lawyers, Dave Frohnmayer was an un-
usually determined advocate. The same determination he brought to
the fight against Fanconi anemia found its way into even routine
cases under his official jurisdiction.282
2. Insensitivity to Minority Religions
Another lesson from the Smith case, pointing to the significance of the
book, concerns insensitivity to minority religions. In Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association,283 the Supreme Court, per Justice
O'Connor, ruled that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the gov-
ernment from permitting timber harvesting in, or constructing a road
through, a portion of a National Forest that has traditionally been used
for religious purposes by members of three Native American tribes in
northwestern California.284 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
dissented from the judgment of the Court.285 Professor Epps painted a
picture of the sacredness the three tribes in question, the Karok, Tolowa,
and Yurok peoples, attached to the property here at stake:
Since time out of mind, the three tribes had viewed this "high coun-
try" as the home of the spirits who lived on earth before the emer-
gence of humans and who lingered on, hidden in rock formations,
streams, and stands of virgin forest, to watch over the earth and its
people. All three bands believed that regular rituals in the high
country were what kept the earth in harmony. . .. In addition, In-
dian shamans and curing doctors used the high country as a retreat
where they could receive power from the spirit world. Old people
hiked laboriously into its high recesses to pray for renewal of their
health. Young people went there to acquire power and see visions.
281. See id.
282. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
283. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
284. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
285. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision. Id.
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For these three bands, the high country was the Wailing Wall, the Ba-
silica of Guadelupe, and Mecca rolled into one.286
The Court reasoned, "the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of
what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what
the individual can exact from the government. ' 287 Justice O'Connor ac-
knowledged that "the logging and road-building projects at issue in this
case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious prac-
tices[,]" 2 "s but contended that the land in question was government land,
and Native Americans had no right to tell the federal government what to
do with "what is, after all, its land. 2z89 Therefore, she said, strict scrutiny
did not apply at all because the burdens here, in her assessment,
286. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 190
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (emphasis added).
287. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 440 (1988).
288. Id. at 451. This is familiar territory for Justice O'Connor who had a tendency, in
her opinions, to acknowledge problems but refuse remedy. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (stating that the Court had "no doubt that the sorry history of
both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportu-
nities for black entrepreneurs," yet ruling the race-conscious program for minorities at
issue in the case unconstitutional); and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
237 (1995) (calling "the unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects
of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country ... an unfortunate reality,"
yet imposing strict scrutiny of all race-conscious programs, including those designed by
Congress).
289. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988). Profes-
sors Noonan and Gaffney suggest that for all of her disclaim of insensitivity, Justice
O'Connor's acknowledgment of the devastating effect of logging on Native American re-
ligious practices was still arguably insensitive, given that "[i]n any normal relationship," it
is the person impacted by the behavior, rather than the one engaged in the conduct at issue
that decides the (in)sensitivity of the behavior in question. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & ED-
WARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 515 (2001). At any
rate, the story here ended on a positive note. Within months after the decision, Congress
withheld authorization from the Secretary of the Interior to build the proposed G(asquet)-
O(rleans) road, acting under its spending powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also
Amendments to Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
100-446, 102 Stat. 1826 (Sept. 27, 1988); H.R. Rep. No. 713, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988)
("prohibit[ing] the use of funds for construction of the Gasquet-Orleans (G-O) road in
California, pending further review of the issue of Indian religious rights that would be
significantly affected by the road construction."). It is hard to say whether Congress acted
to prevent subsidy from public fund of the private interests of the logging industry or out of
a desire to protect the religious freedom of Native Americans. But whatever the motiva-
tion, the effect was a more sensitive awareness of the religious needs of Native Americans.
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: His-
TORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERN-
MENT 515-16 (2001).
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amounted only to "incidental effects of government programs, which may
interfere with the practice of certain religions."29
During the course of the opinion, Justice O'Connor's remarked that
"[n]othing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental in-
sensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen." 291 The reference to "in-
sensitivity" in the heading tracks or draws on Justice O'Connor's
statement. Justice Scalia is rightly rapped as author of the opinion and
"crown prince" of the Smith Court that took religious freedom away. 92
But it is also true that the opinion was only part of a general environment
of "insensitivity to the religious needs" of minorities that predated the
issuance of the Smith case in 1990. This environment of governmental
insensitivity to minority religions was part of the main reason why Native
American civil rights, religious, and other opinion leaders, felt apprehen-
sion when the Attorney General of Oregon requested Supreme Court
review for a second time in the Smith litigation and dispute. 93 Also, as
legal scholars, such as Professor Jan Pillai of Temple University School of
Law, have eloquently argued, the action of the Rehnquist Court in nar-
rowing the scope of Congress's enforcement powers under the Four-
teenth Amendment, evident by a case like Flores, signifies "Jimlproper
sensitivity" to the interests, including free exercise of religion, of minori-
ties and other vulnerable groups in our society who are the primary bene-
ficiaries of the rights secured by the Amendment. 94
Insensitivity to minority religions, in this case, a Native American relig-
ion, is a tendency that goes back to the days of the founders of the Ameri-
can republic, who cherished the new country's value of liberty of
290. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 440 (1988).
291. Id. at 453.
292. See Richard Nagareda, Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 705, 739 (1987); see, e.g., GEY, supra note 14, at 861; Laycock,
supra note 90; ECONOMIST, supra note 90; Rabinove, supra note 90; Hentoff, supra note 23;
Yoder, supra note 90.
293. See generally GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON
TRIAL 189-193 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
294. K. G. Jan Pillai, In Defense of Congressional Power and Minority Rights Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Miss. L.J. 431, 517 (1998). Professor Pillai indicates that
one way around this insensitivity would have been for the Court to "streamline its blanket
claim of interpretive autonomy," in a manner that would "let Congress share the interpre-
tive function under the Amendment, based on some mutually agreeable principles of insti-
tutional competence and democratic accountability." Id. For example, the Court could
"assert primary responsibility to interpret the meaning and scope of the Due Process
Clause of the Amendment based on its long familiarity with the concept that is more at-
tuned to the judicial process than to the legislative process." Id. But there should be no
reason, he said, for the Court to seek to "restrain Congress from enacting enforcement
legislation ... designed to protect the free speech or free exercise rights of minorities from
state infringements." Id.
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conscience, but saw no contradiction in denying that liberty to Native
Americans. Thomas Jefferson, who drafted the Virginia Statute for Re-
ligious Freedom and shares, with James Madison, honor as principal ar-
chitect of American religious freedom, well exemplified this habit of
mind. In his Second Inaugural Address, Jefferson assured the American
people that "free exercise" of religion "is placed by the constitution inde-
pendent of the powers of the general government," but "in the very next
paragraph, lamented that the 'aboriginal inhabitants of these countries'
have been misled by those among them who 'inculcate a sanctimonious
reverence for the customs of their ancestors' and teach 'that their duty is
to remain as their Creator made them." 295 Because it does not have the
regular trappings of traditional white religion, such as Bibles, creeds,
sanctuaries, and hierarchies, white Americans have a tendency to view
Native religion as "devil worship" rather than real religion.296 Epps
wrote:
"[I]f Jefferson had been pressed, he would probably have said that
'free exercise' extended to the Indians; what he would have found
incomprehensible is the argument that 'the customs of their ances-
tors' were anything but a kind of pre-religious vestige destined to be
brushed away by exposure to fully developed (that is to say, West-
ern) religious and philosophical concepts., 297
Contemporary evidence of the same insensitivity to Native religion ex-
ists, arguably, in the action of the House of Representatives, commented
upon before in this book review, that would overturn the Smith rule for
all, except practitioners of peyote religion, 298 as well as in the refusal of
the coalition of interest groups fighting to restore religious freedom to
include protection for peyote religion in their advocacy on the ground
that peyote was "controversial., 299 "Respect is an important word to Na-
tive people. Native ways, Native elders, and Native religion are worthy of
295. See id. at 57. With respect to African Americans, Jefferson is cited for another
statement making insensitivity to minority religion an issue of racial discrimination (argued
below in Part IV.C.3.). Jefferson authored the Declaration of Independence, which pro-
claimed, that "all men are created equal," but expressed the belief, that whites were supe-
rior to blacks, "inferior by nature, not condition." See HANES WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C.
SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREE-
DOM 6-7 (3d ed. 2006). Professors Walton and Smith, most fittingly, pinpointed Jefferson
as "the embodiment of the contradiction in the American democracy between its declara-
tion of universal freedom and equality and its practice of slavery." Id. at 8.
296. See GARRETI Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 56
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
297. Id. at 57.
298. See id. at 235.
299. Id. at 230. Epps remarked appropriately that "[1]ike Gideon in the Bible, the
coalition felt the need to send away some of its potential recruits." Id.
THE SCHOLAR
respect even by those who do not follow them, and the white man has
never shown the respect these ways are entitled to." 30
For all the national features described above, Smith is a controversy
over deprivation of religious freedom in Oregon that went national. The
"trial" confronting religious freedom that formed the title of the book
under review is as much a referendum on religious freedom in the Ameri-
can Nation as it is an indication of the nature of religious freedom ac-
corded to adherents of non-mainstream religions in States like Oregon.
Recall that the drafters of the Oregon constitution espoused and prac-
ticed a political philosophy that revolved around "majority rule," to the
relegation of minority rights. 30 ' Because of this history or in spite of it,
Oregon has a long history of discrimination against minority religions.
Smith was not the first occasion that a controversy over religious freedom
originating from Oregon took national stage. Instead, that dubious prize
for Oregon goes to Pierce v. Society of the Sisters.3 "2 Decided in 1925, the
case involved a campaign by Oregon voters, using a direct legislative initi-
ative to eliminate the right of Oregon's Catholics to maintain their own
privately funded parochial schools.30 3 In Pierce, the Supreme Court ruled
the measure unconstitutional and overturned it.30 4 The case stands for
the proposition that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how
and in what manner to educate their children. In the language of the
Court, "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standard-
ize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations., 3 5
Smith makes clear that Pierce is not an aberration, but rather that the
culture of insensitivity to minority religion, in the guise of neutrality, is
still well and alive in Oregon.30 6 One recent policy, in the name of neu-
trality, exemplifying this insensitivity is an Oregon law that bans public
300. Id. at 108.
301. See supra note 216 and corresponding text.
302. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
303. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-33 (1925).
304. Id. at 534-36.
305. Id. at 535.
306. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953, 969 (1998) (stating that the "constitutional thread,
reaching back to the same convention that framed the law excluding non-whites from the
State, was an insistence that the State must remain neutral in all religious matters.") (em-
phasis added); see also id. at 970 (noting that "[t]his vision of the state as a 'neutral' force in
religion resurfaced in decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court around the time that the
Smith II case became a live issue").
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school teachers from wearing "religious dress" while engaged in their du-
ties.307 Epps wrote, "[t]he law was originally aimed at Catholic nuns who
volunteered in rural communities, but the law's survival into the 1980's
formed one constitutional thread that shaped the State's response to Al
Smith and Galen Black."3 8 What has changed today is that minority reli-
gions that were in the past oppressed, like the Catholic Church, have
turned arguably "mainstream," leaving new religions, like the Native
American Church, today among the "small religious groups that cling to
their faith against the secular tide of contemporary society, '"309 as object
of discrimination.
3. The Nature of the Relationship Between the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the Smith Lawsuit Portrays
The third significance of the book is the nature of the relationship be-
tween the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the Smith lawsuit por-
trays. The connection between the two amendments, separated in
passage by seventy-seven years,310 is evident in the fact that the latter
incorporated many guarantees of the former, as indicated in the introduc-
tion in this book review, and applied them against the States through the
Due Process Clause. Although important, this is not the relationship we
are interested in here. Instead, it is the connection between racism 31' and
religious freedom, specifically the notion that individuals and groups dis-
criminated against can also experience a discrimination directed against
their religious practices. Put differently, contempt for the religious prac-
tices of individuals and groups discriminated against in society can exist
as an extension of the general act of racism against these individuals or
groups. It is a connection the Supreme Court itself recognizes. For ex-
307. Id. at 969 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 342.650 (West 1995)); see also Cooper v. Eu-
gene Sch. Dist. No. 43, 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1986) (where the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the state constitution did not protect an experienced public-school teacher who had
converted to the Sikh religion and wished to wear a turban on duty).
308. Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 969 (1998).
309. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 166
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
310. U.S. CONST. amend. I (ratified in 1791 with the nine amendments which form the
Bill of Rights); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (becoming law when ratified in 1868).
311. Racism is "the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for
the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over it." See HANES
WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 5 (3d ed. 2006) (quoting STOKELY CARMICHAEL &
CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF BLACK LIBERATION 3-4 (1967)).
The ideology of white supremacy or minority inferiority is "the set of ideas used in the
United States to justify" racism. Id.
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ample, in her (dissenting) concurrence in Smith, Justice O'Connor noted
that "the First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like
freedom from race discrimination and freedom of speech, a 'constitu-
tional nor[m],' not an 'anomaly." 312 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
v. Hialeah31 3 also embodied these two categories of discrimination,314
which connection the Supreme Court well recognized in striking down, by
an uncommonly unanimous vote, the city ordinances impeding religious
practices in the case. Congress made a similar association between dis-
crimination against minority religion and racism when it listed among its
findings supporting the passage of the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act of 1994, that "the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for
the religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and
marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the risk that they will
be exposed to discriminatory treatment., 315
Sometimes religious discrimination and racism can be so intercon-
nected it is hard to see or say where one scourge ends and the other
begins. Perception of individuals who view themselves as objects of dis-
crimination can also embody both scourges, as when Al Smith blamed his
termination for going to church "on a continuation of being put down, of
my people and our religion not being recognized by you newcomers., 316
A similar perception combining the two viruses is embodied in the
thought of Galen Black, the white co-plaintiff in Smith, who participated
in Native American peyote religion and fought fiercely for Native free
exercise. Black accused ADAPT of "racist discrimination," believed that
whites disrespect Native religion, and blamed his firing and denial of un-
employment compensation on the fact that he involved himself with Na-
tive Americans and their religion.317 Most of the instances of insensitivity
to minority religions recounted in the discussion in Part IV.C.2, including
the statements by Thomas Jefferson, is ineluctably tied to racism.31 8 And
312. Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
313. 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
314. GARRETT Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 236
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001) (commenting, describing the facts of the case,
that "[a] group of black Cuban Americans wanted to build a church in Hialeah, Florida.
Most cities welcome most churches, but Hialeah was settled by white Cuban Americans,
and the church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was devoted to Santeria, a religion that wor-
ships traditional African gods and Catholic saints") (emphasis added).
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(a)(5) (2005).
316. See GARRET Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL
251, 277 (The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
317. See id. at 107.
318. Note particularly Epps's observation that, "[i]f Jefferson had been pressed, he
would probably have said that 'free exercise' extended to the Indians; what he would have
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so too may be the observation by Epps, analyzing the evolution of the
Native American Church, to the effect that:
[m]uch of the Christian theology [of the church] was skilled form of
camouflage, to shield white society from the knowledge that peyot-
ism was a distinctly Native spiritual tradition. Peyote leaders were
careful, too, to keep a low profile, never to challenge authority di-
rectly, and to keep Church matters within the group.319
When Native Americans wondered aloud "whether the white man's
Constitution had room for the[ir] Church," and if it were "time at last to
know where Grandfather Peyote stood" in the constitutional scheme of
things;32 0 when they resolve "to take the[ir] case to the white man's altar
of justice and determine once and for all whether the Constitution was
big enough to include peyote as well as bread and wine[,]" 3 2 ' they spoke
simultaneously to the twin problems of religious discrimination and white
racism.
V. RECOGNITION RESULTING FROM THIS BOOK
In these days of cuts in funding for academic research, Epps's study on
religious freedom was generously supported. To facilitate his research
and writing, Epps received five fellowship research grants, coupled with a
full-year sabbatical from the University of Oregon School of Law. 322 The
book won honorable mention finalist for the American Bar Association
Silver Gavel Award in 2002.323 At the time the book was released in
2001, Epps was an associate professor at the University of Oregon law
school. By 2006, he was promoted to the Orlando John and Marian H.
found incomprehensible is the argument that 'the customs of their ancestors' were any-
thing but a kind of prereligious vestige destined to be brushed away by exposure to fully
developed (that is to say, Western) religious and philosophical concepts." Id. at 57.
319. Id. at 63.
320. See id. at 203.
321. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 256-57
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
322. Id. at 278-79.
323. The American Bar Association Gavel Awards Selection Criteria, http://
abanet.org/publiced/gavel/criteria/html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). The Gavel Award is a
"prestigious award" designed to "recognize products in media and the arts" released the
year preceding the award year that "have been exemplary in helping to foster the Ameri-
can public's understanding of the law and the legal system." See id. Awarded annually
since 1958, it is the highest recognition for creativity that the ABA can confer on an indi-
vidual. See The American Bar Association Gavel Awards, http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/
gavel/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
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Hollis endowed chair in law. While Epps is a productive scholar,324 publi-
cation and acclaim for his book 325 must have contributed to his success.
Did Epps's friendship with Frohnmayer (former law school dean and cur-
rent university president who recruited Epps) influence Epps's profes-
sional achievements? In the book's acknowledgments, Epps, after
disclosing his friendship with "[b]oth Al Smith and Dave Frohnmayer,"
also indicated that Frohnmayer "never tried to influence my views or con-
clusions about the case, which are substantially different from his
own. "326
VI. CONCLUSION
In Smith, the Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, laid down a rule on
"neutral, generally applicable laws" that a vast cross-section of the Amer-
ican society, including civil rights and religious organizations viewed, not
incorrectly, as an erosion of religious freedom. The decision marked a
negative turnaround in the Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence that, in
the wake of Sherbert and its progeny, many have begun to assess, here
again not incorrectly, as progressive. With Lyng, the case also marked a
high point in the culture and environment of insensitivity to minority reli-
gions that pervaded the Rehnquist Court. After nearly seven decades
interpreting the Religion Clauses, counting from Cantwell, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence has been contradictory; Smith made that record
more uneven. The charge relating to free exercise, in the instructive
words of the epigraph, which opened this book review, is that we protect
this right "whenever we can, by protecting sincere religion in most cases
even if we realize that human error will prevent us from protecting it in
all cases." '32 7 Put differently, the task at hand is how "to define and apply
consistently a standard for the Religion Clauses that successfully inte-
grates the history, theory, and pragmatic details of modern religious life
in this country. "328 The effect of Smith and Flores, invalidating the
RFRA, was to stymie movement toward that goal.
324. University of Oregon School of Law Faculty, Garrett Epps, http://
www.law.uoregon.edu/faculty/gepps/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (listing Epps's publica-
tions in the law school's website).
325. In addition to rave reviews, such as the praises embodied in the book's cover, the
book also features as readings in classes on the laws of church and state in the United
States, of the kind leading to the production of this review book review.
326. GARRErr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 277
(The Notably Trials Library 2005) (2001).
327. Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Oct. 4, 1989, at 882, available at http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=886.
328. STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE vi (2d ed. 2001).
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The genius of Professor Epps's research, including the book under re-
view, is that, through the medium of a prose-narrative that is, in marked
contrast to much legal scholarship, readable and accessible, it eloquently
draws attention to this unevenness. But his story on the Smith case did
not incorporate the RLUIPA. This book review updates that story by
incorporating this important law, ruled constitutional by the Supreme
Court in Cutter. It has also highlighted the importance of the Epps's re-
search in a discussion that, in addition to the obviousness of the insensi-
tivity to minority religions Smith spelled, includes a necessary
commentary on the nature of the relationship between the First and Four-
teenth Amendments that the Smith story taught. To an Unknown God is
an important book on an important case relating to free exercise of relig-
ion that should be read by broad cross-sections of the American public,
not just individuals like this writer drawn to the topic initially by the exi-
gencies of academic life. The book is a well-researched, well-written, and
properly nuanced account that also provides a fair portrait of all the par-
ties involved in the Smith lawsuit. Yet, for all its merits, To an Unknown
God is just one story or account on the Smith case that others, such as the
protagonist Galen Black, might choose to disagree with. Reprint of the
book or a new edition in paperback should make the work even more
accessible to a wider audience. For the most intellectual profit, the non-
dilettante reader should read the book along with the other output from
Epps's research, particularly his law review article on the case, of the
same title as the book.
THE SCHOLAR
VII. DATES OF KEY EVENTS RELATING TO THE SMITH CASE
APPENDIX: DATES OF KEY EVENTS RELATING TO THE SMITH CASE
1919 Alfred Leo Smith is born on November 6 in Modoc Point, Ore-
gon, to Delia Jackson Smith. His father's name is not recorded. He was
born a member of the Klamath tribe, a settled and highly acculturated
people who originally lived in South Central Oregon and North Central
California. In the first seven years, Smith and his mother lived with his
grandmother in a house beside the Williamson River.
1925 The Supreme Court decides Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which
sustained a challenge by parochial and private schools to an Oregon law
requiring children to attend public schools. The case signified an anti-
Catholic attempt by Oregon voters during the 1920s, using direct legisla-
tion, in this case, the initiative, to eliminate the right of Oregon's
Catholics to maintain their own privately funded parochial schools.
1935 The abstinence organization, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), is
founded by Bill Wilson, a former stockbroker who drunk away his career
and nearly died of drinking.
1940 David Frohnmayer is born on July 9, in Medford, southern
Oregon.
1947 Galen W. Black is born in Russell, Kansas, on October 1 to Cau-
casian parents.
1949 The Hoover Commission recommends "termination," which
would mandate that Congress no longer recognize Indian sovereignty,
thus eliminating all special rights and benefits.
1953 Wyoming Representative William Henry Harrison introduced,
and Congress passed, a law giving California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin legal jurisdiction over Indian reservations, thus initi-
ating the termination process.
1968 Congress passes the American Indian Civil Rights Act, giving
individual Indians constitutional protection against their tribal govern-
ments. This protection is the same as the protection the U.S. Constitution
provides against state and local governments.
1968 The American Indian Movement (AIM), a protest movement
modeled after the Black civil rights movement, is founded.
1969 Indian activists occupy Alcatraz Island near San Francisco, in
addition to staging sit-ins at the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
1970 Frohnmayer marries Lynne Diane Johnson. The couple bore
five children: Kirsten (born 1973), Mark (1974), Katie (1979), Jonathan
(1985), and Amy (1987). Two of these children, Katie, and Kirsten, died
in 1991, and 1997, respectively, of complications from Fanconi Anemia, a
life-threatening genetic disorder.
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1971 The Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act is passed. The Act
eliminates 90 percent of Alaskan Natives' land claims in exchange for a
guarantee of 44 million acres and almost $1 billion.
1971 Frohnmayer accepts appointment to teach law at the University
of Oregon Law School in Eugene. He holds the position until 1975 when
he was elected to the Oregon House of Representatives.
1975 Frohnmayer is elected to the Oregon House of Representatives.
1976 The Federal government "terminates" its recognition of Kla-
math tribe's sovereignty.
1979 The United States Supreme Court awards the Lakota Nation
$122.5 million in compensation for the United States government's illegal
appropriation of the Black Hills in South Dakota.
1979 Smith attends a Native American ceremony at Makah Reserva-
tion in northwestern Washington where he took the peyote sacrament in
dry form, "approximately two tablespoons." Over the next five years, he
participated in numerous peyote religious ceremonies in Oregon and
elsewhere.
1980 Smith, then 60, marries Jane Farrell, then 27, a Caucasian wo-
man from Pennsylvania. The couple bore a child, Kaila, born in July
1982.
1980 Frohnmayer wins election as attorney general of Oregon.
1982 Galen Black and Alfred Smith accept appointment as counsel-
ors with the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment (ADAPT), a small local alcohol and drug
treatment facility located in Roseburg, Oregon, at the time initiating a
systematic outreach to Native Americans, the largest minority population
in Douglas County. The two later lost their positions for using peyote in
Native American religious services, Black in 1983, and Smith in 1984.
1983 Galen Black attends a Native American Church service where
he took peyote as sacrament.
1986 Justice William J. Brennan Jr., publishes his article, The Bill of
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y. Univ. L. Rev. 535 (Oct. 1986), where he sug-
gested that the golden age of federal civil-liberties litigation was over.
1986 Federal government "termination" of Klamath tribe is ended
and recognition reinstated. However, Klamath land was not returned,
even though tribal members were once again eligible for Indian services.
1988 Congress officially repeals the thirty-five-year-old termination
policy.
1988 Frohnmayer is re-elected as Oregon's attorney general.
1990 The Supreme Court decides Employment Division v. Smith,
which ruled that "neutral, generally applicable laws" that have an inci-
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dental effect on religious practices do not have to be subjected to strict
scrutiny.
1990 Frohnmayer runs for election as governor of Oregon and loses
to Barbara Robert, a Democrat, by 67,000 votes.
1991 The Oregon Legislative Assembly amends Oregon's Controlled
Substances Act to exempt from prosecution the use and possession of
peyote for religious ceremonies.
1991 David Frohnmayer resigns his position as attorney general of
Oregon to become Dean of the University of Oregon School of Law.
1993 Congress enacts the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) restoring strict scrutiny in "neutral generally applicable laws"
that substantially burdens religious practices.
1993 President Bill Clinton appoints Ada Deer as assistant secretary
for Indian affairs. She is the first Indian woman to hold the position.
1994 David Frolnmayer becomes president of the University of
Oregon.
1994 Three hundred representatives from the 545 federally recog-
nized Indian tribes meet with President Clinton. This marks the first time
since 1822 that Indians have been invited to meet officially with a U.S.
president to discuss issues of concern to Indian people.
1994 Congress enacts the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA), allowing the use of peyote in Native American religious
ceremonies.
1996 The University of Arizona creates the first Ph.D. program in
American Indian studies.
1997 The Supreme Court decides City of Boerne v. Flores, which
ruled the RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the States.
1998 Garrett Epps publishes an article in the Arizona State Law Jour-
nal, titled, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Di-
vision v. Smith, the result of his research on the Smith case.
2000 Congress enacts the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) dealing with the protection of land use as relig-
ious exercise, and protection of religious exercise of institutionalized per-
sons (such as individuals in prisons and nursing homes).
2001 Garrett Epps publishes his book on religious freedom titled To
an Unknown God.
2005 The Supreme Court decides Cutter v. Wilkinson, constitutional-
izing section 3 of the RLUIPA, the section dealing with protection of re-
ligious exercise for individualized persons.
Sources: Adapted from the various sources used in this book review
and acknowledged in the footnotes, plus PAULA D. MCCLAIN & JOSEPH
STEWART JR., "CAN WE ALL GET ALONG?": RACIAL AND ETHNIC MI-
NORITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 191-99 (2006).
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